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INTRODUCTION

In the 21st century, the most dangerous contraband is often
contained in laptop computers or other electronic devices, not on
paper.

-Michael

Chertoff2

Customs officials are charged with enforcing over 600 federal laws as
over one million travelers cross United States borders each day.3
Accordingly, the U.S. border has historically been a location where the
government is given greater authority to protect the safety of Americans.
Indeed, although the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, courts have often held that a suspicionless search is
reasonable, simply because it occurred at the border.'

However, should

customs agents have similar free reign to conduct a suspicionless search of a
traveler's laptop? Does a traveler's Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination have any impact on this analysis?

2. Michael Chertoff, Former Secretary, Homeland Security, Opposing View: Searches are
Legal, Essential, http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/07/opposing-view-s.html (July 16, 2008,
00:21 EST).
3. Jayson Ahem, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of
Homeland Security Leadership Journal Archive, CBP Laptop Searches (June 30, 2008),
[hereinafter Ahern, CBP
http://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2008/06/cbp-laptop-searches.html
Laptop Searches].
4. See infra Part II.B (discussing the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment). "[F]or
more than 200 years, the federal government has been granted the authority to prevent dangerous
people and things from entering the United States." Jayson Ahern, Deputy Commissioner, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Laptop Inspections Legal, Rare, Essential (Aug. 8, 2008),
[hereinafter Ahern, Laptop
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/admissibility/labtopinspect.xml
Inspections].
5. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has traditionally condoned
this view, having upheld luggage, purse, wallet, and vehicle searches conducted without any
particularized suspicion. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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While laptops often accompany their owners across international
borders for lawful business purposes, in some instances the devices are used
to store information necessary to carry out illegal, perhaps even deadly, acts
in the U.S. 6 This threat to our national security renders laptops potentially
dangerous items for travelers to transport across the border.7 In fact, the
United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has asserted that its
ability to search laptops is one of its greatest tools in the effort to enforce
U.S. laws and uncover potential threats against the country.8 Given these
factors, issues regarding suspicionless border searches of laptop computers
are highly relevant in modem society.
Despite such relevance, the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to rule on
whether customs agents can conduct a suspicionless search of a laptop.9
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has now joined the Fourth Circuit in holding
that such a search is lawful.' 0 With two U.S. circuits now in agreement,
suspicionless laptop searches may soon become routine at the border.

6. Ahern, CBP Laptop Searches, supra note 3. "During border inspections of laptops, CBP
officers have found violent jihadist material, information about cyanide and nuclear material, video
clips of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), pictures of high-level Al-Qaeda officials, and other
material associated with people seeking to do harm to our country." Id.
7. Ahem, Laptop Inspections, supra note 4. Ahern explains:
[T]errorists and criminals increasingly use laptops and other electronic media to transport
illicit materials that were traditionally concealed in bags, containers, notebooks and paper
documents. Making full use of our search authorities with respect to items like
notebooks and backpacks, while failing to do so with respect to laptops and other devices,
would ensure that terrorists and criminals receive less scrutiny at our borders just as their
use of technology is becoming more sophisticated.
Id.
8. CBP Laptop Searches, supra note 3.
Our ability to inspect what is coming into the United States is central to keeping
dangerous people and things from entering the country and harming the American
people. One of our most important enforcement tools in this regard is our ability to
search information contained in . .. laptops and other digital devices ....
Id.
9. See Christine A. Coletta, Note, Laptop Searches at the UnitedStates Borders and the Border
Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REv. 971, 988 (2007).
10. See United States v. Arnold (Arnold 1l), 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), denying reh'g 523
F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'g 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312
(2009); see also infra notes 100-06, 118-26 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of
United States v. Ickes and UnitedStates v. Arnold). The district court in Arnold noted that this is "an
issue ripe for determination because technological advances permit individuals and businesses to
store vast amounts of private, personal and valuable information within a myriad of portable
electronic storage devices including laptop computers, personal organizers, CDs, and cellular
telephones." United States v. Arnold (Arnoldl), 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd,
523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1312 (2009).
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During these searches, customs agents may encounter a laptop that is
password-protected, potentially frustrating their ability to perform the search
if the traveler is unwilling to reveal the password. The Supreme Court has
yet to determine the constitutional protections afforded to passwords, and
only a federal magistrate has addressed this issue." In re Boucher held that
an individual could assert his Fifth Amendment right to refuse the
production of his password, a decision which could have far-reaching
implications in the border search context. 2
This Comment stresses that the government's ability to conduct
suspicionless laptop searches at the border is in significant conflict with an
individual's right to withhold his laptop password. Accordingly, this
Comment argues that because laptop password-protection could
substantially impede the government's ability to protect our nation, an
exception to the right against self-incrimination should be employed at the
border.13

Part II reviews general search and seizure doctrine and the border
exception to the Fourth Amendment.14 Part III discusses the requisite
elements necessary to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and the application of the privilege to the compelled
production of documents." Part IV explores the border search exception
with respect to laptop searches, emphasizing the Fourth and Ninth Circuit
decisions upholding the suspicionless search.16 Part V examines the possible
constitutional protections applicable to passwords and the challenges to be
faced by the government if Fifth Amendment privileges are available during
a border search." Part VI suggests the creation of a border exception to the
Fifth Amendment, similar to the current Fourth Amendment border search
exception, which would effectively alleviate the potential threat to our
country's national security.'8 Part VII concludes the Commentl 9 and Part

11. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev'd, 2009 WL
424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
12. Id.; see also infra notes 134-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Boucher holding).
Interestingly, In re Boucher involved the suspicionless search of a traveler's laptop at the U.S.
border. See Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at * 1. On January 2, 2008, the Government appealed the
magistrate judge's order granting Boucher's motion to quash the grand jury subpoena, see In re
Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *1 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009), revg 2007 WL 4246473
(D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), and on February 19, 2009, the magistrate judge's holding was reversed. Id.
at *4; see also infra Part VIII.
13. See infra Part VI. Alternatively, a less extreme option would be to create federal legislation
requiring travelers to temporarily disable password-protection on their laptop computers if they plan
to travel internationally. See infra note 193.
14. See infra notes 21-52 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 53-96 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 97-131 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 132-59 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 160-93 and accompanying text.
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VIII is a Postscript discussing the most recent district court reversal of In re
Boucher.20
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE

A.

FundamentalProtectionsof the FourthAmendment

The Fourth Amendment guarantees that people shall be "secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Furthermore, the Amendment provides that "no [w]arrants shall
[be issued without] probable cause," requiring that law enforcement officers
obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search.22 These Fourth Amendment
limitations were incorporated into the Bill of Rights to prevent government
interference with an individual's right to privacy.23 Within the confines of
one's home, for instance, an individual has such a significant privacy interest
that most warrantless searches of the home will be deemed unreasonable.24
Nonetheless, the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is not an
absolute right.25 Particular circumstances may justify setting aside the

19. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 198-210 and accompanying text. This Comment was written prior to the
district court's reversal of In re Boucher. Thus, the Postscript discussing the most recent Boucher
holding follows the Conclusion.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. Id.
23. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) ("The Fourth Amendment
imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive
interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals."). See
also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975) ("The Fourth Amendment's requirement that
searches and seizures be reasonable also may limit police use of unnecessarily frightening or
offensive methods of surveillance and investigation."); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 878 (1975).
24. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 17 (1948) ("The right of officers to thrust
themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which
chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance .... An officer gaining
access to private living quarters under color of his office and of the law which he personifies must
then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion. Any other rule would undermine 'the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' and would obliterate one of the
most fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law,
and the police-state where they are the law.").
25. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.").
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warrant requirement and only examining the search's reasonableness by
balancing the government's interest in conducting the search against the
individual's privacy interest. 26 If the government's interest is so high that an
individual could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, a warrantless
search may be found lawful under the Fourth Amendment.27 An example of
a search that, due to its characterization as reasonable, requires neither
probable cause nor a warrant is a search conducted at the U.S. border,
authorized even before the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution. 28
B.

The Fourth Amendment Border Search Exception

The First Congress of the United States enacted the original customs
statute in 1789, authorizing customs officials to "enter and search 'any ship
or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed .... 29 Customs statutes
were originally created to prevent travelers from introducing contraband into
the U.S. or avoiding the payment of duties by concealing goods transported
across the border.30 Yet, the current proliferation of drug trafficking and
terrorism has resulted in the expansion of customs officials' roles in
protecting U.S. borders.3 1 Accordingly, U.S. officials have been authorized
to conduct searches at the nation's borders and its functional equivalents,
such as international airports.32 When balancing the government's interest

26. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citing United States
v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983)); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)
("The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches
requires 'balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.' On one side of
the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on
the other, the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.")
(citation omitted).
27. Some exceptions to the warrant requirement include searches incident to arrest, searches of
people in custody, searches at entrances to courthouses, searches at or near our nation's border, and
driver's license and vehicle registration checks. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985).
28. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). See infra text accompanying notes 29,
34.
29. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616 (citing Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, 1 Stat. 29. § 24). The broad
authority provided for in this statute was specifically distinguished from the limited power of
entering and searching an individual's home, which would require a warrant and probable cause. Id.
30. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
31. See Ahern, CBPLaptop Searches, supra note 3. Jayson Ahern asserts that the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection has a duty to ensure that no item brought into the United States poses a threat
to our nation's security, and that "[t]o treat our inspections of digital media at the border differently
from any other documents or conveyances would give terrorists and criminals an advantage they
should not have and that our nation cannot afford." Id
32. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) ("[A] search of the passengers
and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City would
clearly be the functional equivalent of a border search.").
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against an individual's privacy interest in the border search context, the U.S.
Supreme Court has often emphasized that the scale is tipped in favor of the
government.
The Supreme Court has "faithfully adhered" to the interpretation that
searches taking place at U.S. borders are reasonable and not subject to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement simply for the reason that a person
or object has "entered into our country from the outside."34 Courts have
consistently rejected a particularized suspicion requirement for routine
border searches of containers, such as luggage, purses, or wallets.3 1 Courts,
as well as Congress, have also authorized the inspection of vehicles and

33. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1985). According to
then-Justice Rehnquist, because of the need to protect the country's borders, a Fourth Amendment
reasonableness determination is much different at the border than in the interior. Id. at 538. Justice
Rehnquist further notes in UnitedStates v. Flores-Montano,541 U.S. 149 (2004), that an individual
has a lesser expectation of privacy at the international border. Id. at 154. In Carroll v. United
States, Chief Justice Taft discussed the difference between the government's power at the border and
its power within the country's interior:
Travellers [sic] may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of
national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself
as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.
But those lawfully within the country ... have a right to free passage without interruption
or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable
cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.
267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). See also United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S.
123, 125 (1973) ("Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the national borders rest
on different considerations and different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations.");
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) ("[A] port of entry is not a
traveler's home. His right to be let alone neither prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of
unprotected, but illegal, materials when his possession of them is discovered during such a search.
Customs officers characteristically inspect luggage and their power to do so is not questioned in this
case; it is an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the
country.").
34. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617, 619 (1977). In Boyd v. United States, the
Supreme Court noted:
As [the Act of July 31, 1789] was passed by the same Congress which proposed for
adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that
body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as "unreasonable," and they are not
embraced within the prohibition of the [Fourth] [A]mendment.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623.
35. See U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) ("The luggage carried by a traveler entering the
country may be searched at random by a customs officer ... no matter how great the traveler's
desire to conceal the contents may be."); United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995)
("In a border search, a person is subject to search of luggage, contents of pockets, and purse without
any suspicion at all."); United States v. Wilmot, 563 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that
even "mere suspicion" is not required to search the contents of a person's baggage, purse, wallet, or
pocket at the border).
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vessels crossing the border regardless of the suspicion present. The search
of a traveler's outer clothing, such as one's pockets, has similarly been
authorized without any suspicion.
However, as to the search of one's
person beyond the body's surface, the Court has refrained from suggesting
its view as to the level of suspicion necessary. t Accordingly, circuit courts
36. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 ("We have long recognized that automobiles seeking
entry into this country may be searched."). Moreover, 19 U.S.C. § 158 1(a) states:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at any
place in the United States or within the customs waters or, as he may be authorized,
within a customs-enforcement area established under the Anti-Smuggling Act, or at any
other authorized place without as well as within his district, and examine the manifest
and other documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle
and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end
may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel
compliance.
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2006); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (2006) ("[A]ll persons coming into the
United States from foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search by authorized officers or
agents of the Government under such regulations."); 19 U.S.C. §482(a) (2006) ("Any of the officers
or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop, search, and examine ... any vehicle,
beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to
duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law . . . ."). It is
important to note that although Congress has authorized, and the Supreme Court has similarly
approved vehicle border searches regardless of the level of suspicion present, the Supreme Court has
suggested that the manner in which a search is conducted may be so offensive as to characterize the
search as unreasonable. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13. The Supreme Court's recognition of this
possibility seems to contradict the rest of the Ramsey majority opinion, which explains that border
searches of people and property are reasonable simply because they occur at the border. See supra
text accompanying note 34. The Supreme Court may have meant that the authority to conduct a
border search will always be reasonable, but the manner in which the search is conducted may
violate the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement. See infra note 52 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's similar indication in Flores-Montano).
37. See Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2002) ("While the Supreme Court
has never . .. explicitly classified patdowns as routine, of those courts of appeals which have
addressed the patdown issue since Montoya de Hernandez ... all have held that such
patdowns ... require no suspicion whatsoever."); United States v. Nieves, 609 F.2d 642, 646 (2d
Cir. 1979) (reasonable suspicion not required to compel a traveler to remove his shoes for
inspection), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980); United States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir.
1978).
38. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 n.4 ("[W]e suggest no view on what level of
suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border searches such as strip, body-cavity, or involuntary
x-ray searches."). But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) ("The interests in
human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions
[beyond the body's surface] on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.").
Schmerber seems to indicate that particularized suspicion would be required in order to conduct a
more invasive search of one's person. Yet, it is perplexing why the Supreme Court in Montoya de
Hernandez implied that particularized suspicion may not even be necessary to conduct border
searches beyond the body's surface. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 n.4. The answer may
be that Schmerber did not involve a border search, but rather the forced compulsion of a blood
sample after an individual was arrested for driving under the influence. Schmerber,384 U.S. at 75859. Outside of the border search context, individual privacy interests are generally given greater
weight when balanced against the government's interest, causing the Supreme Court to find that
particularized suspicion is necessary away from the border. See supra note 26 and accompanying
text.
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are left with the responsibility of interpreting if and when particularized
suspicion is necessary to classify a more invasive border search as
reasonable.39
To determine the reasonableness of a border search, many courts have
interpreted Supreme Court precedent to apply a routine versus nonroutine
search analysis.40 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez"' and United
States v. Flores-Montano42 remain two of the most frequently cited cases in
the border search context. In Montoya de Hernandez, the Supreme Court
expressed that "[r]outine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are
not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or
However, the Court specifically indicated it was not
warrant...."
offering an opinion as to the suspicion required in "nonroutine border

39. See, e.g., U.S. v. Oyckan, 786 F.2d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1986) ("We join those circuits holding
that a reasonable suspicion that a person is carrying drugs on the outside of the body may insulate a
strip search from [F]ourth [A]mendment challenge."); U.S. v. Ogberaha, 771 F.2d 655, 658 (2d Cir.
1985) ("To justify a strip search conducted at the border the circumstances must warrant a
'reasonable suspicion' that the party to be searched is guilty of illegal concealment."), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1103 (1986); United States v. Carter, 590 F.2d 138, 139 (5th Cir. 1979) ("In this circuit, the
standard for conducting... a strip search[] at a border is that Customs officials must have
reasonable suspicion that the party to be searched is concealing contraband on his person."), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979). Using past case law to determine when reasonable suspicion is
required can be challenging because the facts of prior border search cases often involve the presence
of reasonable suspicion before the search takes place. See Lindsay E. Harrell, Note, Down to the
Last JPEG: Addressing the Constitutionality of Suspicionless Border Searches of Computers and
One Court's Pioneering Approach in United States v. Arnold, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 205, 219 (2008)
(discussing how the Fifth, Second, and Ninth Circuits have previously avoided deciding whether
customs officials can conduct suspicionless border searches of laptops because the cases before them
Consequently,
involved some level of suspicion present prior to the respective searches).
disagreement can be found among various circuits regarding the necessity of reasonable suspicion to
search. Compare Anderson v. Comejo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (contending
that "a standard patdown search[] requires some level of suspicion that the person has contraband on
his or her person"), with Bradley, 299 F.3d at 202 (no suspicion required to conduct a patdown
search). The varying interpretations of the law between the Central District of California and Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Arnold further illustrate the need for greater Supreme
Court clarification. See infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of both
Arnold I and Arnold II).
40. See Harrell, supra note 39, at 210; see also Jon Adams, Rights at United States Borders, 19
BYU J. PUB. L. 353, 356 (2004-2005); Coletta, supra note 9, at 981; Kelly A. Gilmore, Comment,
Preserving the Border Search Doctrine in a Digital World: Reproducing Electronic Evidence at the
Border, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 759, 766 (2007).
41. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
42. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
43. 473 U.S. at 538. Such "routine" searches are less likely to infringe on a traveler's privacy
rights and include stopping passengers in vehicles attempting to cross the border or searching the
baggage of travelers arriving at U.S. airports. See Gilmore, supra note 40, at 767.

113

searches such as strip, body-cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.""
Despite the Court's explicit statement, lower courts have cited Montoya de
Hernandezto support the premise that "nonroutine" searches of one's person
typically involve a greater invasion of one's privacy rights, and thus require
reasonable suspicion.45
In 2004, the Supreme Court revisited Fourth Amendment implications at
the border, this time in the context of vehicle searches, in United States v.
46
Flores-Montano.
Writing on behalf of the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained that the Ninth Circuit had misunderstood Montoya de
Hernandez in its determination that the search of a vehicle's fuel tank
required reasonable suspicion. 4 7 The Ninth Circuit had incorrectly used the
Supreme Court's analysis for the routine searches of one's person to
subsequently create a balancing test that was improperly premised on the
search's intrusiveness and erroneously expanded to vehicles.48 The Court
44. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 n.4. The Supreme Court has not given much
discussion as to what constitutes a "nonroutine" search other than the three examples provided in
Montoya de Hernandez, a description included merely in a footnote. Moreover, Montoya de
Hernandez's discussion is somewhat confusing, causing some circuit courts to misinterpret its
holding. For example, Montoya de Hernandez involved the extensive detainment of a traveler and
the subsequent search of her alimentary canal. Id. at 534-35. Initially, the Court explained that the
traveler's detention was justified if customs officials reasonably suspected that the traveler was
smuggling drugs within her digestive system. Id. at 541. Yet, this reasonable suspicion requirement
applied to the detainment of the alleged smuggler, not to the search of the alimentary canal itself.
Id. In fact, the search was not even at issue in Montoya de Hernandez because customs agents had
already obtained a warrant prior to conducting the rectal examination. Id. at 535. The Court
specifically stated, "It is also important to note what we do not hold.... [W]e suggest no view on
what level of suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border searches .....
Id. at 541 n.4
(second emphasis added). Ultimately, the Court concluded that the particular detainment in
Montoya de Hernandez was lawful because, prior to detaining her, customs agents reasonably
suspected that the traveler was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. Id at 544. The Court's
holding regarding the detainment, not the search, can easily be misread and may have been clearer
had the Court avoided hiding what they were not holding within a footnote. The Third Circuit, for
instance, has incorrectly interpreted Montoya de Hernandez stating, "In Montoya de
Hernandez ... the Court concluded that an alimentary canal search was not 'routine' and is justified
only if customs agents reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in his or her
alimentary canal." Bradley, 299 F.3d, at 202 (emphasis added). Even recently, the Ninth Circuit, in
Arnold II, similarly misinterpreted Montoya de Hernandez stating, "the Supreme Court has held that
reasonable suspicion is required to search a traveler's 'alimentary canal."' United States v. Arnold
(Arnold l), 533 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008), denying reh g 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'g
454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993) ("When a border
search and seizure becomes nonroutine, a customs official needs reasonable suspicion to justify it.");
Anderson v. Comejo, 199 F.R.D. 228, 246 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("As to nonroutine searches, however,
defendants must have at least reasonable suspicion."); see also supranote 44.
46. 541 U.S. 149 (2004). Rather than involving a search and seizure of one's person, as was the
case in Montoya de Hernandez, Flores-Montano involved the search of one's property, specifically
the disassembly and reassembly of a vehicle's fuel tank after the driver was stopped at the U.S.
border. Id. at 151.
47. Id. at 152.
48. Id. The Court was referring to the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Molina-
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clarified that a search of one's person might be so intrusive as to implicate
an individual's privacy and dignity interests, and thus require particularized
suspicion. 4 9 However, the invasion of one's privacy and dignity interests
was only to be considered with respect to the search of one's person and not
to the search of one's vehicle. 0 The Court reiterated that "[c]omplex
balancing tests to determine what is a 'routine' search of a vehicle, as
opposed to a more 'intrusive' search of a person, have no place in border
searches of vehicles." 5 ' Finally, the Court explicitly did not reach the
question as to whether and when a border search of personal property
conducted in a highly offensive or destructive manner might be deemed
unreasonable.52
In addition to implicating Fourth Amendment privacy interests, the
government's expansive authority at the border may similarly infringe on an
individual's Fifth Amendment right if travelers are required to provide oral
or written information that makes their belongings accessible to customs
officials.

Tarazon, where the appellate court made the very general determination that "[iln order to conduct a
search that goes beyond the routine, an inspector must have reasonable suspicion .... [T]he critical
factor. . . between 'routine' and 'nonroutine' turns on the level of intrusiveness." Id. (quoting
United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F. 3d 709, 712-13 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogatedby United States
v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004)).
49. Id.; see also infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of the Flores-Montanolanguage in its Arnold HIdecision).
50. Flores-Montano,541 U.S. at 152. The Court's specification that an analysis of whether there
was an invasion of one's privacy and dignity interests was to apply only to the search of one's
person indicates that the search of property may never be characterized as "highly intrusive." This is
precisely how the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Flores-Montano holding when it decided Arnold II.
See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text. However, this interpretation does not necessarily
mean that the search of one's property would never be considered unreasonable, as the Court in
Flores-Montano left open the possibility that destructive searches of one's property may be one
example of a search requiring reasonable suspicion. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 n.2. The
Court might have come to this conclusion by opining that a destructive search is one conducted in a
highly offensive manner. Id For further discussion see infra note 46 and accompanying text.
51. Flores-Montano,541 U.S. at 152.
52. Id. at 154 n.2.; accord United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 ("We do not decide
whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed 'unreasonable' because of
the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out."). For a discussion of the Court's similar
comment in United States v. Ramsey, see supra note 36. Notably, both of these statements were
made in footnotes and lacked any further clarification by the Court. The suggestion that the Court
may be differentiating the authority to search from the manner in which the search is conducted
when examining a border search's reasonableness is further supported in the Flores-Montano
opinion. See supra note 50. While the possibility exists that the manner in which officials conduct a
search can be too offensive to be reasonable, the Court clarified that the suspicionless disassembly
and reassembly of a vehicle's fuel tank does not represent such a situation. Flores-Montano, 541
U.S. at 155-56.
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III.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person. . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ."s The
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is one that favors
individual privacy and dignity interests when balanced against the interests
of the government. 54 Thus, the government is required, by its own means, to
produce evidence against its citizens rather than force an individual to speak
of his own guilt." The privilege, however, does not prevent the government
from discovering all evidence from the accused.
Rather, the Fifth
Amendment only prohibits the forced extortion of incriminating
"communications."

53.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

Scholars have found references to Fifth Amendment principles in

the Bible: "To sum up the matter, the principle that no man is to be declared guilty on his own
admission is a divine decree." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 n.27 (1966) (quoting
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Code of Jewish Law), BOOK OF JUDGES, LAWS OF THE SANHEDRIN, c.
18, 1 6, III Yale Judaica Series 52-53). The historical event responsible for the Fifth Amendment's
inclusion in the U.S. Constitution was the trial of John Lilbum. Id. at 458-59. Lilburn was forced to
take the Star Chamber Oath in 1637, which would have required him to answer any and all questions
asked by the Court. Id. at 459. Lilbum resisted the oath stating: "Another fundamental right I then
contended for, was, that no man's conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed, to answer to
questions concerning himself in matters criminal, or pretended to be so." Id (quoting THE
LEVELLER TRACTS, 1647-1653, at 454 (William Haller & Godfrey Davies eds., 1944)).
Parliament's subsequent eradication of the Court of Star Chamber was favored in England and the
Colonies, and the protection against self-incrimination eventually became part of the U.S. Bill of
Rights. Id. at 459-60.
54. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (1966) ("[T]he [Fifth Amendment] privilege has come
rightfully to be recognized in part as an individual's substantive right, a 'right to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy."') (quoting United
States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S.
391 (1957)).
55. Id. The Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a governmentstate or federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a
"fair state-individual balance," to require the government "to shoulder the entire load," to
respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal
justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the
evidence against him by its own independent labors ....
Id. (citation omitted).
56. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910). "[T]he prohibition of compelling a
man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material." Id Accordingly, the Court in Holt held that the Fifth Amendment would not
apply if a prisoner is compelled to put on specific clothing. Id.
57. See Adam C. Bonin, Comment, Protecting Protection: First and Fifth Amendment
Challenges to CryptographyRegulation, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495, 509 (discussing the notion that
the government may be prevented from compelling a witness to orally testify against himself, but
may be able to compel him to produce "real or physical evidence").
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A.

Fifth Amendment Limited to the Protectionof Compelled,Incriminating
Testimony

In order to seek Fifth Amendment protection, an individual must first be
compelled to testify as a witness against himself.58 The government can
formally compel in-court testimony by serving an individual with a
subpoena that, absent a valid privilege, subjects that person to contempt of
court if he refuses to testify or produce documents. 9 Grand juries are
responsible for issuing subpoenas and can do so both when someone is
charged with a crime and while the government is merely investigating
possible unlawful activity.60 Alternatively, law enforcement officials can
informally compel an individual to speak during in-custody questioning due
to the inherent pressures accompanying the interrogation process. 6 ' Hence,
58. United States v. Doe (Doe 1), 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 45. At a minimum, an individual is compelled to be a witness against himself
when he faces the "cruel trilemma" of truth, falsity, or silence during a criminal case where he is
effectively forced to choose between telling the truth and testifying against himself, lying and
committing the crime of perjury, or remaining silent and facing a contempt of court charge. See
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596-97 (1990).
60. Grand juries are responsible for summoning witnesses and compelling the production of
documents to determine whether "there is [an] adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge." In re
Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In order to facilitate the grand
jury's examination of witnesses prior to formally charging an individual with a crime, the prosecutor
must inform the grand jury of the appropriate witnesses to call and documents to request. See United
States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977). Subpoenas are not difficult to obtain, and
even easier to acquire as compared to a search warrant, because subpoenas are not processed through
the courts and do not require a showing of probable cause. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547, 562-63 (1978); see also United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) ("[T]he
Government cannot be required to justify the issuance of a grand jury subpoena by presenting
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause because the very purpose of requesting the
information is to ascertain whether probable cause exists."); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273,
282 (1919) ("[A grand jury] is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition,
the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of
the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found
properly subject to an accusation of crime. As has been said before, the identity of the offender, and
the precise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are developed at the conclusion of the
grand jury's labors, not at the beginning.").
61. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966). Chief Justice Warren states:
[T]he modem practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than
physically oriented....
... An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by
antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion . . . cannot be otherwise
than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the
isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official
investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or
trickery.
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compulsion in the Fifth Amendment context hinges on whether
communications are made voluntarily. 62 If the accused has voluntarily
confessed to the government or otherwise willingly produced incriminating
information, the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be asserted.
In addition to compulsion, the communication sought must be
criminally incriminating.64 Incriminating statements include both statements
made during trial, as well as statements that are not incriminating on their
face, but lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence. 65 Accordingly,
information is incriminating if it "furnish[es] a link in the chain of evidence"
used to prosecute that individual for a crime.
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only applies
where a person has reasonable grounds for fearing criminal prosecution as a
result of his testimony.67 If an individual has not been charged with a crime,
Id. at 448, 461.
62. Id. at 478. "In order to combat these [compelling] pressures and to permit a full opportunity
to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively
apprised of his rights . . . . [H]e must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the
right to remain silent." Id. at 467-68.
63. Id. at 467. "Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is,
of course, admissible in evidence." Id. at 478. Where the accused is faced with a choice to produce
communications, compulsion may be lacking. For instance, in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.
553 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test
may be admitted into evidence without violating the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 564. Although a
positive blood-alcohol result would constitute incriminating evidence of the defendant's
intoxication, no compulsion was present because the officers gave the defendant the option to either
take the test or refuse to take it. Id. at 562. The Court noted, however, that providing the accused
with a "choice" does not necessarily end the compulsion analysis. Id. at 562-63. For instance, a
suspect has a choice when confronted with the cruel trilemma, to choose between truth, falsity, or
silence, but forcing one to face the cruel trilemma has long been held to constitute compulsion. Id
at 563; see also supra note 59. Moreover, the "choice" between confessing or submitting to an
extremely painful, severe, or dangerous test or operation still likely constitutes compulsion. See
Neville, 459 U.S. at 563 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966)).
64. The Fifth Amendment includes the language "in any criminal case," indicating that the
privilege against self-incrimination only applies to information that would render subsequent
criminal charges. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 266 n.1
(1983) ("If there is no possibility of a criminal case, then the privilege would not apply." (quoting
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 564-65 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
65. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 37 (2000). Justice Stevens noted:
[A] half century ago we held that a trial judge had erroneously rejected a defendant's
claim of privilege on the ground that his answer to the pending question would not itself
constitute evidence of the charged offense.. . . Compelled testimony that communicates
information that may "lead to incriminating evidence" is privileged even if the
information itself is not inculpatory.
Id. at 37-38 (referring to the Court's holding in Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951)).
66. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
67. .Id. In its discussion of reasonable grounds, the Supreme Court relies on Mason v. United
States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917), which, in turn, employs Chief Justice Marshall's words during the trial
of Aaron Burr: "The principle which entitles the United States to the testimony of every citizen, and
the principle by which every witness is privileged not to accuse himself, can neither . .. be entirely
disregarded." Mason, 244 U.S. at 364 (quoting United States v. Burr (In re Willie), 25 Fed. Cas. No.
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he is not absolved from answering questions simply because he asserts that
his answers would be incriminating.
Rather, the court must determine
whether the witness is likely to suffer harm, and if so, the protection must be
given.69
Finally, to assert the Fifth Amendment, the information compelled must
be testimonial. 70
Testimonial communications must "explicitly or
implicitly[] relate a factual assertion or disclose information." 7' The
disclosure of information is only testimonial when it expresses the contents
of an individual's mind.7 2 Incriminating physical evidence derived from
one's body is not protected by the Fifth Amendment unless the physical
evidence in some way reveals the person's thoughts.
38, 39-40 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692e). The Court also relies on statements of law found in The
Queen v. Boyes:
[T]he danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the
ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things-not a danger of an imaginary
and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible
contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his
conduct. ... [A] merely remote and naked possibility, out of the ordinary course of the
law and such as no reasonable man would be affected by, should not be suffered to
obstruct the administration ofjustice.
Mason, 244 U.S. at 365-66 (quoting The Queen v. Boyes, (1861) 121 Eng. Rep. 311, 330 (K.B.));
see also Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) ("The central standard for the privilege's
application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely
trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.").
68. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 ("The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he
declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself-his say-so does not of itself establish the
hazard of incrimination."); see also Mason, 244 U.S. at 366 ("[I]t would be to convert a salutary
protection into a means of abuse if it were to be held that a mere imaginary possibility of danger,
however remote and improbable, was sufficient to justify the withholding of evidence essential to
the ends of justice.").
69. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87. Justice Clark states:
It is for the court to say whether [the witness's] silence is justified, and to require him to
answer if "it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken." . . . To sustain the
privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in
which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it
cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. The
trial judge in appraising the claim "must be governed as much by his personal perception
of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence."
Id. (citations omitted).
70. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
71. Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
72. Id. at 210 n.9 ("We do not disagree with the dissent that '[t]he expression of the contents of
an individual's mind' is testimonial communication for purposes of the Fifth Amendment." (quoting
id. at 219 n.l (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
73. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990); see also infra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text (providing examples of physical evidence one might be compelled to produce
that are not protected under the Fifth Amendment). For examples of physical evidence that may
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The characterization of information as testimonial depends on the
particular facts of each case.7 4 Compulsion to provide a handwriting 5 or
voice sample, submit to a blood test,n try on a piece of clothing, and
provide one's signature79 have all been held to be not testimonial for
constitute testimony, and thus would be protected, see Schmerber v. California,384 U.S. 757, 764
(1966) (although a lie detector test measures changes in the body's functions, the test may also
record an individual's psychological responses) and South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 561 n. 12
(1983) ("A second example of seemingly physical evidence that nevertheless invokes Fifth
Amendment protection [addressed] . . . . compelled disclosures during a court-ordered psychiatric
examination. We specifically rejected the claim that the psychiatrist was observing the patient's
communications simply to infer facts of his mind, rather than to examine the truth of the patient's
statements.").
74. Doe 11, 487 U.S. at 214-15.
75. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (handwriting is of course a form of
communication, but a handwriting sample, used solely for its "identifying physical characteristics"
and not for its content, does not come within Fifth Amendment protection).
76. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967) ("[C]ompelling Wade to speak within
hearing distance of the witnesses, even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not
compulsion to utter statements of a 'testimonial' nature; he was required to use his voice as an
identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his guilt.").
77. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772. Schmerber held that "[s]ince the blood test evidence, although
an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to
some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds."
Id. at 765.
78. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910). The Holt Court admitted testimony that
the defendant put on a blouse and it fit him, explaining that "[t]he objection in principle would forbid
a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof." Id. at 253.
79. Doe 11, 487 U.S. at 219. In Doe II, the petitioner was ordered to sign a consent directive
authorizing three foreign banks to release bank records of "all accounts over which Doe had a right
of withdrawal, without acknowledging the existence of any such account." Id. at 204. The Court
held that signing the consent directive would not violate the petitioner's constitutional right against
self-incrimination because there was no implicit or explicit factual assertion or disclosure of
information. Id. at 215. By drafting the form to speak in the hypothetical, the form did not identify
which banks would be contacted, communicate whether any foreign bank accounts existed or were
under the petitioner's control, or acknowledge whether the unidentified foreign banks possessed any
documents relating to the petitioner. Id. Furthermore, the petitioner's signature would not
communicate his consent to the release of bank records because the bank would only be informed
that the signature was in response to a court order for the release of documents that "may" exist and
"may" be relevant to the investigation. Id. at 216-17. Such compulsion, the majority explained, was
similar to "be[ing] forced to surrender a key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents."
Id at 210 n.9 (quoting id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). In his dissent, Justice Stevens
contemplated the alternative, acknowledging there may be times when a defendant may legally be
"forced to surrender a key to a strongbox." Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
argued that the present case was different, however, not because the petitioner was forced to
surrender a hypothetical key, but rather because he was unlawfully "compelled to reveal the
combination to his wall safe-by word or deed." Id. This analogy of producing a key (physical
evidence) as opposed to a wall safe combination (information stored in one's mind) has been used in
subsequent Supreme Court and lower court decisions when analyzing whether communication is
testimonial. For instance, the Hubbell Court used the Doe II analogy, comparing the defendant's
production of subpoenaed documents to the disclosure of a wall safe combination, which made
"extensive use of the contents of [the defendant's] own mind." United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S.
27, 43 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). See infra note 146 and accompanying text
(discussing the magistrate judge's consideration of this same analogy in In re Boucher).
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purposes of the Fifth Amendment. On the other hand, the Supreme Court
has found compulsion to calculate the date of one's birthday to be
testimonial because the answer's content discloses "the operations of [the
accused's] mind in expressing it."so These examples illustrate that a person
can be compelled to produce incriminating evidence without violating the
Fifth Amendment, so long as the individual is not forced to disclose his
psychological processes. 8'
B.

Application of the Fifth Amendment to Documents and Other Tangible
Items

In addition to oral and physical testimony, the Fifth Amendment
privilege extends to the compulsion to produce documents and similar
tangible items.82 Compliance with a request to produce such items can
potentially disclose incriminating information in two ways: first, through the
document's substantive content, and second, through the actual act of
producing it.
1. Content Privilege
In the 1886 decision of Boyd v. United States, the Supreme Court
declared that "compelling the production of [a man's] private books and
papers, to convict him of a crime . .. is contrary to the principles of a free
government." 83 At that time, the Court was interpreting the Fifth
Amendment to protect the substantive content of documents and to prohibit

80. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592, 594 (1990). Muniz, in his intoxicated state,
could neither remember nor calculate the date of his sixth birthday, leaving him with the option to
either incriminate himself by admitting that during the custodial interrogation he could not
remember the date, or answer untruthfully with a date he, at that time, knew was inaccurate. Id at
599. Either answer would indicate that Muniz's mental processes were impaired and violate his
right against self-incrimination. Id.
81. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 34-35.
82. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
83. Id at 631-32. The Court further states, "we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of
a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from
compelling him to be a witness against himself." Id. at 633. In Boyd, the Government ordered the
defendants to produce an invoice as proof that the defendants had imported cases of glass into the
United States without paying the required duty. Id. at 618. Although the defendants asserted their
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the lower court admitted the invoice and found the
defendants guilty. Id The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was inadmissible
because forcing an individual to produce documents against him would violate his Fifth Amendment
rights. Id at 622.
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the taking and use of documents as evidence against the accused.84
However, the Court has since rejected such broad document protection,
clarifying that the Fifth Amendment would not apply in the absence of
compulsion to create the document.8' Thus, if the government subpoenaed
voluntarily prepared documents, such as one's tax returns, Fifth Amendment
protection would not be available even if the documents contained
incriminating, testimonial statements because their maker was not compelled
to create them. 86
2. Act of Production Privilege
Although the content of voluntarily produced documents may not
receive Fifth Amendment protection, the act of producing those documents
may be privileged." Compliance with a subpoena request may, in effect,
implicitly communicate testimonial and incriminating information merely by
handing over the information requested. 8

84. See id. at 633-35.
85. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36 ("It is clear, therefore, that respondent Hubbell could not avoid
compliance with the subpoena served on him merely because the demanded documents contained
incriminating evidence, whether written by others or voluntarily prepared by himself"); United
States v. Doe (Doe 1), 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (content of the defendant's business documents not
privileged under the Fifth Amendment); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (subpoena to
produce tax papers voluntarily prepared by an accountant does not constitute compulsion under the
Fifth Amendment).
86. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409. The statement that a man is protected from compelling his
"private books and papers" indicates that the Boyd Court may have intended to distinguish one's
private papers from other types of documents. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-35. However, the
Supreme Court has suggested that such a distinction no longer exists. For example, in Fisher,the
Court noted its multiple references to the Boyd distinction in dictum of the Court's prior opinions,
but stated that the Court had yet to find a current rationale for such a distinction. Fisher, 425 U.S. at
408-09. Regardless, the circumstances present in Fisher did not require the Court to review the
Boyd proposition because the documents compelled were not the defendant's "private papers." Id. at
414. Subsequently, in Doe I, the Court held that the contents of the respondent's business records
were not privileged under the Fifth Amendment, also noting that the business documents were
somewhat less personal than the Fisherdefendant's personal tax returns. Doe 1, 465 U.S. at 610 n.7,
612-13. Justice O'Connor concurred, finding the majority's opinion to imply that "the Fifth
Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind." Id. at
618 (O'Connor, J., concurring). More recently, in Hubbell, Justice Thomas opined that failing to
include the production of voluntarily produced documents as protected communications under the
Fifth Amendment conflicted with the Amendment's original meaning. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49
(Thomas, J., concurring). He argued that a historical examination reveals that the term "witness"
actually refers to "a person who gives or furnishes evidence," a broader definition found in
dictionaries published during the country's founding. Id. at 50. This alternate definition, coupled
with the language of the common law privilege against self-incrimination and the similar broad
meaning found in the Sixth Amendment today, indicate that the privilege was to extend to any
incriminating evidence. See id at 49-54. Because the "private papers" distinction was not at issue
in Hubbell, Justice Thomas agreed to reconsider its application in the future. Id. at 56.
87. Doe I, 465 U.S. at 612.
88. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410; see also infra text accompanying note 90 (listing the three
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Fisher v. United States explored the ramifications of a subpoena
ordering the defendant to produce documents used by his accountant in
preparation of the defendant's tax return.89 In examining the information to
be revealed by the defendant's compliance, the Court highlighted three
factual assertions that may be independently communicated through the act
of production: (1) the documents requested actually exist, (2) the documents
are in the individual's possession or control, and (3) the documents produced
are the same ones described in the subpoena.90 If these factual assertions are
sufficiently testimonial and incriminating, certain documents that would not
otherwise receive a content-based privilege may be eligible for Fifth
Amendment protection under the act of production privilege. 91 However,
these implicit act of production assertions might not receive Fifth
Amendment protection if the Government proves that its independent prior
knowledge of the facts communicated renders the information a "foregone
conclusion."92 Such was the case in Fisher, where the Government
overcame the Fifth Amendment obstacle by using the accountant's
preparation and possession of the defendant's tax papers to establish that the
documents' existence, possession, and authenticity was a "foregone
conclusion."93 Hence, it was unnecessary for the Government to rely on any
communications conveyed by the defendant's act of production.94
testimonial assertions that can be implicitly communicated through the act of production).
89. Fisher,425 U.S. at 393-94. Fisher consolidated multiple cases involving IRS investigations
about possible violations of the federal tax laws. Id Both defendants transferred their tax
documents from their accountants to their respective attorneys, and asserted their right against selfincrimination, accountant-client privilege, and attorney-client privilege. Id. at 395. The Court held
that none of the privileges applied. Id. at 396.
90. Id.at410.
91. Id. The Court notes that "[tihe act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena
nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers
produced." Id.
92. Id. at 411. When the Government can prove existence, possession, and authenticity, the
defendant "adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by conceding that
[the defendant] in fact has the papers." Id. "When the government has sufficient preexisting
knowledge about the documents or records summoned, apart from existence and possession, the
question becomes one 'not of testimony but of surrender."' Thomas Kiefer Wedeles, Note, Fishing
for Clarity in a Post-Hubbell World: The Need for a Bright-Line Rule in the Self-Incrimination
Clause'sAct ofProduction Doctrine, 56 VAND. L. REv. 613, 625 (2003).
93. Fisher,425 U.S. at 411.
94. Id. The Supreme Court has failed to specify a particular standard of proof that the
Government must meet in order to establish that existence, possession, and authenticity are foregone
conclusions. See Phillip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 171, 182-83. In Fisher, the accountant's involvement easily enabled the Government to
prove a foregone conclusion, and thus the Court did not need to determine the requisite degree of
prior knowledge to be possessed by the Government. Yet, in Hubbell, the Supreme Court
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The act of production may become particularly relevant at the U.S.
border due to recent case law expanding the government's authority to
search laptop computers.95 The common use of passwords to secure one's
laptop suggests that customs officials may need to compel travelers to
provide their laptop passwords so that officials can search the machine.
While the government generally enjoys expansive power to search at the
border, it is unclear whether this authority extends to compelling the
production of passwords, as it potentially implicates the Fifth Amendment
by forcing travelers to testify as witnesses against themselves.
IV.

LAPTOP SEARCHES AT THE UNITED STATES BORDER

Continuing technological advancements have forced customs officials to
screen not only tangible items hidden in one's luggage, clothing, or
alimentary canals of the body, but also intangible data stored in electronic
form. 97 Circuit courts have often avoided deciding whether a laptop search
was routine or nonroutine because particular fact patterns allowed them to
affirm or reverse on other grounds. Currently, only two federal courts of
considered the act of production when no third party was involved, determining that the Government
had failed to prove a foregone conclusion, and thus the Fifth Amendment applied. United States v.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000). In Hubbell, the defendant was subpoenaed to produce 13,120
pages of documents connected with a pending grand jury investigation in exchange for immunity.
Id. at 31. Once the defendant produced the documents, however, he was indicted for criminal
charges in a new, unrelated investigation. Id. Aside from its unpersuasive argument that a
businessman will always possess business documents, rendering the documents' existence and
possession a foregone conclusion, the Government had in no way demonstrated its prior knowledge
of the documents' existence or its ability to independently authenticate them. Id at 44-45.
Moreover, because the documents were expected to implicate the defendant in the first federal
prosecution, the Government did not expect to discover new incriminating information that would
lead to a separate prosecution of the defendant. Id. at 42-43. Similar to the Fisher decision, the
Hubbell Court still refrained from adopting a clear standard of proof necessary to demonstrate a
foregone conclusion, stating: "Whatever the scope of this 'foregone conclusion' rationale, the facts
of this case plainly fall outside of it." Id. at 44. However, when characterizing the issue at the start
of its opinion, the Court mentioned the Government's inability to demonstrate existence with
"reasonable particularity." Id. at 30. Reasonable particularity is the standard used to evaluate the
validity of a search warrant pursuant to the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant
"particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV; see also United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97-98 (2006). The Hubbell
Court, however, did not use the "reasonable particularity" term anywhere else in its opinion other
than in its initial description of the issue, indicating that the Court may not have intended to
recognize this standard.
95. See infra Part IV.
96. A case has yet to include a fact pattern where border officials encounter a traveler refusing to
provide them with his laptop password. The closest case on point is In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91,
2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev'd, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). For a
discussion of Boucher, see infra notes 134-49 and accompanying text, as well as Part VIII.
97. See supra notes 2, 66-88 and accompanying text (discussing the need to search electronic
devices).
98. See supra note 39; see also United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006)
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appeals have specifically addressed the suspicionless search of laptops-the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Ickes and the Ninth Circuit in United

States v. Arnold-each circuit determining that customs officials possess the
authority to search laptops without any particularized suspicion. 99
A.

United States v. Ickes: "A Laptop is Merely Cargo"

In United States v. Ickes, U.S. customs officials discovered
pornographic photographs of young boys, drug contraband, and a warrant
for John Ickes's arrest during a vehicle search at the U.S. border.o After
arresting Ickes and continuing their search of his vehicle, agents discovered
a laptop and disks containing additional child pornography. 0' Having been
subsequently charged with the transportation of child pornography, Ickes
sought to exclude the content of his laptop and disks from evidence, arguing
that his First and Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. 102
The Fourth Circuit declined to accept Ickes's claim that because
electronic equipment was not clearly included in the language of customs
statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), a warrant was required to search his laptop and

(finding that because Romm failed to raise, in his opening brief, that the border search of his laptop
was too intrusive to be "routine," the issue was "waived."); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110,
124 (2d Cir. 2006) (requiring no determination to be made of whether the border search of computer
diskettes was routine or nonroutine because reasonable suspicion, derived from a tip that the traveler
was transporting child pornography, was present before customs officials searched the diskettes);
United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 2001) (avoiding the discussion of
whether the laptop search was routine because Roberts had already consented to the search as well as
admitted his disks contained child pornography, providing customs officials with probable cause to
search).
99. United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Arnold (Arnoldl), 533
F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), denving reh'g 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'g 454 F. Supp. 2d 999
(C.D. Cal. 2006), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
100. Ickes, 393 F.3d at 502-03. When customs officials stopped Ickes at the border between
Canada and the United States, Ickes explained that he was returning home from vacation. Id. at 502.
However, the officials were confused because Ickes's automobile looked to be carrying "everything
he own[ed]." Id. Customs officials intended to only conduct a brief search of Ickes's van, but after
discovering a video recording of a tennis match that focused exclusively on a young ball boy, they
became suspicious and proceeded with a more detailed inspection. Id. This inspection gave rise to
the incriminating items found within Ickes's vehicle and the subsequent discovery of his laptop
containing child pornography. Id. at 503.
101. Id at 503. Ickes admitted to customs officials that his laptop contained videos of minors
engaged in sexual acts, confirmed the existence of his outstanding warrants, and revealed that he was
wanted in Virginia for child abuse. Id.
102. Id. The district court denied Ickes's motion to exclude the laptop and disks because the
search was conducted pursuant to the border exception to the Fourth Amendment. Id. Ickes was
thereafter found guilty of transporting child pornography. Id.
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disks.10 3 Based on its recognition of the government's expansive border
search powers, the court concluded that the search was lawful because §
1581(a)'s term "cargo" encompassed "[any good] transported by a vessel,
airplane, or vehicle," including Ickes's laptop and disks.104 Moreover, the
court refused to create an exception to border searches that would exclude
the search of "expressive material," such as Ickes's laptop.105 In response to
Ickes's contention that every international traveler carrying a laptop would
now be subject to a search of his electronic files, the court explained that a
lack of time and resources would most likely require that customs agents
search a traveler's laptop only after some other factor triggered suspicion. 06
Although indicating that suspicion was not required to search a laptop at
the border, the Ickes decision was still another case where reasonable
suspicion was present before the search.'0 o Furthermore, Ickes involved a
border search of a vehicle, which has historically not required particularized
suspicion. 0 8 Had the search not included a vehicle, but rather taken place at
an airport, the Fourth Circuit may have analyzed the search differently.
Unlike Ickes, United States v. Arnold presented a unique fact pattern
involving a laptop border search not preceded by any real suspicion. Such
circumstances finally forced the Ninth Circuit to tackle the question that
other circuits had avoided and the Supreme Court has yet to decide.

103. Id. at 505. For the text of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) see supra note 36.
104. Ickes, 393 F.3d at 504. The characterization of a laptop as cargo implies that the court
viewed a laptop search as the type of ordinary or "routine" search authorized by Congress, although
the court never explicitly stated as such. Yet, the court did cite Flores-Montanoas clear support for
its conclusion that the laptop search was reasonable. Id. at 505 n. 1.
105. Id. at 506. The court noted that exempting expressive material from border searches would
greatly impede the government's ability to protect its borders if, for instance, the government could
not seize terrorist communications because they were "expressive." Id. For further discussion of the
court's refusal to recognize a First Amendment exception see infra notes 170-72 and accompanying
text.
106. Id. at 506-07. The court never expressly stated whether particularized suspicion would be
necessary to conduct such a search, but its failure to discuss whether the customs officials possessed
reasonable suspicion to search Ickes's van indicates the court's belief that particularized suspicion
was not necessary. Furthermore, the court's discussion of the unlikelihood that customs agents
would search laptops without prior suspicion suggests the court's view that suspicionless laptop
searches are lawful, and travelers should not worry about their frequent imposition unless the
traveler was to arouse additional suspicion. See id. at 507.
107. See Harrell, supra note 39, at 221. The photos of the young boys, drugs, and warrant for
Ickes's arrest led to the customs agents' continued search of Ickes's van where they discovered his
laptop. Ickes, 393 F.3d at 502-03.
108. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing vehicle searches at the border).
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B.

United States v. Arnold: "Laptops Do Not Carry Sufficient Privacy and
Dignity Interests"

In United States v. Arnold, Michael Arnold was selected for secondary
questioning at a U.S. customs checkpoint, following his arrival at the Los
Angeles International Airport.' 09 Customs officials requested that Arnold
turn on his laptop, and then proceeded to search Arnold's picture files,
discovering a photo of two nude women.o Arnold was questioned about
his laptop for several hours while agents further searched the computer and
eventually uncovered several photos of child pornography. 1 ' In response to
his indictment for multiple counts of child pornography, Arnold sought to
exclude his laptop's content, arguing that the suspicionless search violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. 112
The Central District of California, the first court to preside over the
Arnold case, explicitly held that customs officials could not search a laptop
at the border in the absence of reasonable suspicion. 113 The district court
interpreted United States v. Flores-Montano to mean that certain border

searches are highly intrusive if they implicate an individual's privacy and
dignity interests.l 14 Moreover, the court determined that a nonroutine,
intrusive search had occurred, requiring a higher level of suspicion." 5
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit, the district court concluded that a laptop was
not mere cargo, but rather an extension of one's own memory, which if
109. United States v. Arnold (Arnold1l), 533 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008), denying reh'g 523
F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'g 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312
(2009). Arnold had just completed a twenty-four hour flight from the Philippines. Id. During
Arnold's secondary questioning, customs agents inquired about where Arnold had traveled, the
length of his stay, and the purpose of his trip, to which Arnold responded that he had spent three
weeks in the Philippines visiting friends. Id.
110. Id. Arnold's computer desktop contained folders, two of which were titled "Kodak Pictures"
and "Kodak Memories." Id. After discovering the photo of nude women within these folders,
special agents with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement were called to conduct
more extensive questioning. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1006. Amold argued that, under the Fourth Amendment, reasonable suspicion was
necessary to search the contents of a laptop, and such suspicion was not present before customs
agents searched Arnold's computer. Id.
113. United States v. Arnold (Arnold 1), 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 523 F.3d
941 (9th Cir. 2008), reh'g denied, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312
(2009).
114. Id. at 1002.
115. Id at 1003. Judge Pregerson misstated previous Supreme Court precedent, indicating that
suspicion is required to conduct an intrusive search, when the Supreme Court has only indicated that
highly intrusive searches might support a requirement of particularized suspicion. See United States
v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
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searched, could invade an individual's privacy and dignity interests even
more so than a physically intrusive strip search.'1 6 Accordingly, the
California district court held that customs officials did not possess
reasonable suspicion prior to inspecting Arnold's laptop, and therefore the
search was illegal."'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took quite a different approach to
the border search of laptops, reversing the district court and holding that
particularized suspicion was not required to search."'8 The court's decision
was premised on an alternative interpretation of Flores-Montano that
prohibited the application of intrusive balancing tests to all property,
reserving such scrutiny solely for highly intrusive searches of one's
person." 9 The court rejected Arnold's argument that the intrusiveness
analysis discussed in Flores-Montano should apply to his laptop because
Flores-Montano only prohibited its application to the search of vehicles.20
The Arnold II court stressed that the Supreme Court did not intend to
distinguish vehicles from other types of property, and instead, meant that
vehicles, as a form of property, do not carry the same privacy and dignity
interests as one's person.1 2 1 Furthermore, the court opined that the Supreme

116. Arnold 1, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1000, 1003. Judge Pregerson noted that laptops contain
numerous private thoughts and personal information such as financial records, personal letters,
medical information, trade secrets, or confidential client information. Id. at 1004-O5. Furthermore,
a reasonable person is likely to experience fear or apprehension if the government possessed the
authority to search within an individual's mind, further justifying Fourth Amendment protection. Id.
at 1004. However, Judge Pregerson failed to acknowledge that people can similarly be fearful or
apprehensive knowing that the government has the authority to search their luggage. Travelers can
respond to that fear by choosing not to travel with items that might cause concern or lead to
embarrassment should those items be discovered by customs agents. Individuals traveling with
laptops can likewise choose to transfer particularly confidential, incriminating, or otherwise private
information from their hard drives to an external memory device before traveling. While such a
procedure may be slightly inconvenient, international travelers are well aware that there is a lesser
expectation of privacy at the border. See supra note 33 (discussing this diminished privacy
expectation).
117. Arnold 1,454 F. Supp. 2d at 1004. The district court explained that the Government has the
burden to prove the search was reasonable. Id at 1006. Yet, the court found the customs agent's
testimony unpersuasive as to the presence of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1004. The agents' failure
to complete a written record at the time the search took place, as well as the inconsistent and
imprecise testimony of one of the agents who conducted the inspection, was "fatal to the
Government's case." Id.at 1005.
118. United States v. Arnold (Arnold 1l), 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he district
court's holding that particularized suspicion is required to search a laptop, based on cases involving
the search of the person, was erroneous."), denying reh'g 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'g 454 F.
Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
119. Id; see also infra note 121 and accompanying text.
120. Arnold II, 533 F.3d at 1008. Arnold was referring to the following statement in FloresMontano: "Complex balancing tests to determine what is a 'routine' search of a vehicle, as opposed
to a more 'intrusive' search of a person, have no place in border searches of vehicles." FloresMontano, 541 U.S. at 152.
121. Arnold II, 533 F.3d at 1008. The court's argument is supported by the Flores-Montano
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Court has never meant to use a "routine" versus "nonroutine" balancing test;
the Court stated in Flores-Montanothat "routine" has merely been used as a
descriptive term in the border search context.1 22
The court did not suggest, however, that particularized suspicion would
never be required to search property, recognizing that some property
searches may be so destructive, or conducted in such an offensive manner,
as to warrant a higher level of suspicion.123 Nonetheless, neither of those
two circumstances was present in this case, as Arnold did not claim his
laptop was damaged from the search and he did not present evidence that the
search was conducted in a "particularly offensive manner."1 24 Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit declined to accept Arnold's argument that a laptop's storage
capacity makes the device "capable of functioning as a home" and thus

Court's use of the word "property" in referencing the customs officials' manipulation of a vehicle's
fuel tank: "While it may be true that some searches of property are so destructive as to require a
different result, this was not one of them." Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155-56 (emphasis added).
If the Court truly meant to distinguish vehicles from property, it would have likely used the phrase
"some searches of vehicles" rather than choosing the broader term "property."
122. Arnold II, 533 F.3d at 1007. To support this proposition, the court cited one of its previous
decisions, United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2005), amending 383 F.3d
1093 (9th Cir. 2004), which discussed the Flores-MontanoCourt's rejection of another Ninth Circuit
holding, United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogatedby United
States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004). For discussion of the Molina-Tarazon holding see
supra note 48 and accompanying text. Cortez-Rocha rejected a "routine" versus "nonroutine" test
due to the Supreme Court's criticism of the Ninth Circuit's use of such a test in Molina-Tarazon. Id.
The Arnold II court also cited United States v. Chaudlry, in which a different panel of Ninth Circuit
judges interpreted Flores-Montanoto limit the use of a "routine" versus "nonroutine" balancing test
to the searches of property. United States v. Chaudhry, 424 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005). Based
on Supreme Court precedent, it is unclear whether the Court intended to create a routine and
nonroutine distinction limited to searches of a person or if such a distinction was never intended to
apply to border searches. See Coletta, supra note 9, at 980 ("The U.S. Supreme Court has not
explicitly distinguished routine from nonroutine searches."). The Supreme Court initially used the
term "routine" with respect to border searches in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
272 (1973) (federal government has the power to conduct "routine inspections and searches of
individuals or conveyances seeking to cross our borders"). Over the course of the subsequent
decade, the Court characterized certain border searches as "routine" in over a dozen cases, and first
used the word "nonroutine" in UnitedStates v. Montoya de Hernandez in conjunction with examples
of searches beyond the body's surface. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541
n.4 (1985). Yet even in Montoya de Hernandez, the Court never provided a definition of
"nonroutine" and did not expressly state that a nonroutine search would require a standard of
suspicion different from a routine search. Thus, it is possible that the terms routine and nonroutine
are truly descriptive words, and not meant to be distinguished by separate balancing tests of
intrusiveness.
123. ArnoldII, 533 F.3d at 1007-08 (citing Flores-Montano,541 U.S. at 152, 155 n.2).
124. Id. at 1009. Arnold only stated that the customs agents "had [him] boot [the laptop] up, and
looked at what [Arnold] had inside." Id.
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worthy of higher Fourth Amendment protection. 12 5 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit in declaring that reasonable suspicion was
not required to search a traveler's laptop at the border.126
C. JudicialResponse After Arnold
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Arnold H has already greatly impacted
border search doctrine and will likely continue to do so.1 2 7 Multiple laptop
search cases have been appealed to the Ninth Circuit since the Arnold H
holding, and the court of appeals has continued to uphold the suspicionless
search of laptops at the border.128 Other federal circuits have cited the
Arnold II decision as support that reasonable suspicion is not required to
conduct a laptop border search.129 Arnold II has even affected the holdings

125. Id. at 1009-10. The court found no case law to support Arnold's contention that an item's
storage capacity had any bearing on the offensiveness of a search. Id. at 1010. Additionally, the
court cited Californiav. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1985), which admitted evidence from the
warrantless search of a mobile home despite the party's argument that the mobile home was
"capable of functioning as a home." ArnoldII, 533 F.3d at 1009.
126. ArnoldII, 533 F.3d at 1008.
127. On July 18, 2008, only a few months after the Arnold holding, the Department of Homeland
Security published the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's POLICY REGARDING BORDER SEARCH
OF INFORMATION, which specified the government's authority to search, without any particularized
suspicion, any electronic device transported across the border. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION,

POLICY

REGARDING

BORDER

SEARCH

OF

INFORMATION,

2

(2008),

http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travel/admissibility/search authority.ctt/search-authority.pdf.
On September 11, 2008, Representative Loretta Sanchez introduced the Border Search
Accountability Act of 2008, intended to establish specific standards by which customs officials
could inspect, seize, copy, and share a traveler's belongings and information. See Border Search
Accountability Act of 2008, H.R. 6869, 110th Cong. (2008). Sanchez was motivated to create the
legislation due to the "lack of protections individuals have when their electronic equipment is
randomly seized." Roy Mark, Bill Targets Laptop, Mobile Device Search and Seizures (Sept. 15,
2008), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Mobile-and-Wireless/Bill-Targets-Laptop-Search-and-Seizures.
Sanchez also explained that U.S. citizens would be able to travel across the country's borders with
"more peace of mind knowing that their data will be further protected and that there are stringent
accountability measures in place for safeguarding their personal information." Id. On September
26, 2008, Senator Russ Feingold went a step further, introducing the Travelers' Privacy Protection
Act of 2008, aimed to completely prevent the suspicionless search of laptops at the border. Lester
M. Paredes III, The Travelers' Privacy Protection Act of 2008: Be Reasonable with My Private
Information and Expensive Equipment, 45 No. 1 CRIM. L. BULL. 1 (2009) (citing the Travelers'
Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. (2008)). Among a number of other
restrictions, the suggested legislation would require customs officials to possess reasonable suspicion
and obtain a supervisor's approval prior to conducting a border search. See S. 3612, §§ 4(a), 5(a).
128. See United States v. Singh, 295 F. App'x 190, 190 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Singh's argument that
the border officer needed reasonable suspicion to search his laptop computer is squarely foreclosed
by United States v. Arnold. There, we held that searches of the defendant's computer hard drive at
the border . .. did not require reasonable suspicion.") (citation omitted); United States v. Hilliard,
289 F. App'x 239, 239 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Arnold II to reject the argument that a person has a
heightened level of privacy in the contents of his laptop).
129. See United States v. Bunty, No. 07-641, 2008 WL 2371211, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2008);
see also United States v. Pickett, No. 07-0374, 2008 WL 4330247, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2008)
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of state courts, such as a CaliforniaCourt of Appeals decision which, shortly
after Arnold II was decided, found suspicionless laptop searches at the
border valid under the Fourth Amendment.130
In February 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Arnold's petition for
certiorari, allowing the Arnold II holding to remain binding authority in the
Ninth Circuit."' While it is uncertain whether other circuit courts will
follow the Ninth Circuit's decision, the current uniformity between the Ninth
and Fourth Circuits warrants consideration of other constitutional rights that
may be implicated once an international traveler is compelled to present his
laptop at the border, specifically one's Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.
V. DOES FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION EXTEND TO THE PRODUCTION
OF PASSWORDS?

At the U.S. border, claims of Fourth Amendment violations may be
more common, but the particular circumstances surrounding a border search
may also support a viable Fifth Amendment claim. One such circumstance
involves a search that customs officials are unable to conduct without the
traveler's assistance because the traveler has protected his device with a
password.13 2 If customs officials need the traveler to type or state his
password in order to make the item accessible, the search has expanded to
include
the possible compulsion of incriminating testimonial

(citing Arnold II as support that customs officials do not need reasonable suspicion to search a
traveler's laptop).
130. People v. Endacott, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 907 (Ct. App. 2008). In Endacott, U.S. customs
officials questioned Endacott about his trip to Thailand. Id at 907. The customs agent found it odd
that Endacott traveled to Thailand for four months and returned from such a hot climate wearing a
leather jacket and gloves. Id. at 908. Consequently, Endacott was referred to secondary inspection
where customs officials searched his two laptops and discovered numerous images of nude
preadolescent females. Id. Endacott was charged with ten counts of possession of child
pornography. Id. at 907. He sought to suppress the evidence obtained from his laptop, arguing that
the search required reasonable suspicion because a laptop, containing expressive materials, is
entitled to greater protection than other forms of property. Id. at 908-09. The court reasoned that
although viewing one's private computer files may implicate privacy and dignity interests, those
interests are not affected any more so than the search of a locked briefcase containing intimate,
confidential documents. Id. at 909. Accordingly, the court held that a laptop is afforded no greater
protection than any other container, and reasonable suspicion is not necessary to search it. Id.
131. See Arnold H1, 533 F.3d 1003. Although the suspicionless border search of laptops is quite
timely, the Supreme Court may have denied certiorari until the issue rendered a circuit court split.
132. The inability to search may only be an issue when individuals travel with electronic devices.
In most other situations, customs officials can use the physical force necessary to break open an item
if the traveler insists on transporting it across the border. See infra note 168.
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communication. In such a situation, a Fifth Amendment privilege may be
applicable.
A.

In re Boucher Holds Such ProtectionExists

A magistrate judge's 2007 evidentiary ruling, In re Boucher, was the
first decision to hold that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects an
individual's password.'
In Boucher, customs officials searched Sebastien
Boucher's vehicle when he attempted to enter the U.S. from Canada.13 4
During the search of Boucher's car, agents inspected picture and video files
on a laptop computer found in Boucher's back seat, noticing that some of the
files had pornographic titles.' 35 The agents subsequently located thousands
of pornographic images, some including children, and one file which could
not be opened due to password-protection.'3 6 Boucher admitted that he
downloaded child pornography and then accessed his laptop's drive Z,
allowing the agents to view numerous additional pictures and videos of child
pornography.'13 The agents thereafter arrested Boucher and seized his
laptop. 138
Weeks later when agents attempted to view Boucher's drive Z a second
time, the hard drive was password protected with an encryption algorithm
that could take the Government years to break.'39 As a result, a grand jury
subpoenaed Boucher to produce "all documents, whether in electronic or
paper form, reflecting any passwords used or associated with the Alienware
Notebook ComputerFalse." 40 The Government suggested that Boucher
input the password outside the presence of the grand jury and offered to
refrain from using his act of entering the password against Boucher in
subsequent criminal prosecution.14' Despite the Government's proposal,

133. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev'd, 2009 WL
424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
134. Id. at *2.
135. Id. One of Boucher's laptop files was titled, "2yo getting raped during diaper change." Id. at
*1.
136. Id. at *2. The customs official was able to determine that the protected file had been opened
less than a week before the border search. Id. at * 1.
137. Id. at *1. It is unclear whether Boucher entered a password to access his drive Z at that time.
When asked during a telephone interview if he had typed in his password during the border search,
Boucher responded: "I prefer not to answer that one." Ellen Nakashima, In Child Porn Case, a
DigitalDilemma: US. Seeks to Force Suspect to Reveal Password to Computer Files, WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/1
5/AR2008011503663.html.
138. In re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2.
139. Id. For over a year, the Government has been unable to access the drive Z on Boucher's
laptop. Nakashima, supra note 137.
140. In re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2.
14 1. Id.
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Boucher moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that production of the
password would violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination. 142

Initially, the court concluded that the subpoena constituted compulsion
and the disclosure of files purportedly containing child pornography would
be incriminating to Boucher.143 Thus, the court was left to determine
142. Id. The Federal District of Vermont is part of the Second Circuit, which has not determined
whether suspicionless laptop searches violate the Fourth Amendment. If the Government eventually
files formal criminal charges against Boucher, it will be interesting to see whether Boucher tries to
suppress the suspicionless laptop border search from evidence. The failure to challenge the search
may indicate the party's recognition that suspicionless laptop searches are becoming accepted as
lawful at the border. For a discussion of the district court's reversal of In re Boucher, see infra Part
VIII.
143. In re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2. Although compulsion and self-incrimination were
present in Boucher's situation, suppose customs agents requested the password during the border
search itself, rather than weeks after the search took place and the laptop was seized. Would there be
sufficient compulsion during the actual border search to warrant Fifth Amendment protection? If a
traveler's subjection at the border to possible inspection and questioning constitutes custody, and an
agent's questioning of him signifies interrogation, then the inherent elements of coercion present in
such a scenario may constitute compulsion. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. However,
circuit courts have generally held that custodial interrogation is not present at the border. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 2006) (defendant not in custody when customs agent
questioned defendant based on suspicion that defendant was lying about helping Chinese nationals
enter the U.S.); United States v. Ozuna, 170 F.3d 654, 658 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 599 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("Routine citizenship checks ... do not
impose a degree of restraint associated with arrest because the detention is by nature brief and
subject to the scrutiny of other travelers, the intrusion is limited in scope, advance notice obtains and
visible signs of authority mitigate rather than enhance the perceived degree of restraint.")); United
States v. Fernandez-Ventura, 132 F.3d 844 (1 st Cir. 1998) (defendants not in custody where customs
officials sent them straight to secondary inspection to be interviewed and searched, and were
surrounded by armed officers for at least one hour and twenty minutes); United States v. Leasure,
122 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1997) (defendant not in custody while in primary inspection area
because "[s]tops and routine questioning are the norm at the border in the primary inspection
areas"); United States v. Harrell, 894 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1990) (not in custody where defendant was
taken to a nearby INS office separated from the public, interviewed by multiple INS officers for
sixty to seventy-five minutes, and physically restrained to a lesser degree than would be the case
during a formal arrest). Nevertheless, some courts have indicated that when questions are "distinctly
accusatory," they may transform the encounter into custody. See United States v. Hudson, 210 F.3d
1184, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1120 (11th Cir. 1996).
Interestingly, the Third Circuit has even considered distinguishing questions during customs
inspections as "routine" or "nonroutine," but noted that most circuits have characterized all border
questioning as "routine." Kiam, 432 F.3d at 529. The fact that a traveler has the option to return to
his country of citizenship, rather than participate in the customs inspection, may further decrease the
existence of compulsion at the border. It is important to reiterate however, that the presence of
choices does not necessarily mean compulsion does not exist. See supra note 63. Regardless, the
legal force of a subpoena will generally still be available even before an individual has been arrested
and charged with a crime. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the grand jury's
broad investigatory powers). Thus, ifa customs agent discovers suspicious password protected files,
he can contact a federal prosecutor to obtain a grand jury subpoena of the traveler's password. The
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whether Boucher's act of inputting the password was sufficiently testimonial
to receive Fifth Amendment protection. 144 By entering the password, the
court found that Boucher would admit to both his knowledge of the
password and his access to the drive Z files, even if Boucher entered the
password outside the grand jury's presence.145 Revealing the password
would be analogous to revealing the combination to a wall safe; both are
facts stored in one's mind, and therefore, amount to testimonial
communication. 146 Finally, the court rejected the Government's contention
agent could temporarily detain the traveler while awaiting the subpoena, and once served, the
subpoena would constitute sufficient compulsion under the Fifth Amendment.
144. In re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2. Both parties agreed that: (1) the laptop's content
was not privileged because the media files were voluntarily downloaded; (2) Boucher could not be
forced to orally provide the password in court because it would reveal the contents of Boucher's
mind; and (3) reciting the password would be incriminating by providing a link in the chain of
evidence. See Susan W. Brenner, The Privacy Privilege: Law Enforcement, Technology, and the
Constitution, 7 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 123, 186 (2002); see also Reitinger, supra note 94, at 203, 205
("In general, courts will not compel oral testimony that may be incriminating.... Thus, only truly
memorized passwords might defeat the government's subpoena power .... ); Aaron M. Clemens,
Comment, No Computer Exception to the Constitution: The Fith Amendment Protects Against
Compelled Production of an Encrypted Document or Private Key, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2,
available at http://www.lawtechjoumal.com/articles/2004/02_040413 clemens.php ("Compelling
production of a memorized [password] can never be permissible. Such an act is particularly
analogous to the forbidden act of compelling production of 'the combination to a wall safe."'). For
discussion of the "combination to a wall safe" comparison see supra note 79 and infra note 146.
145. In re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2.
146. Id. at *4. The court uses the Supreme Court's analogy from Doe v. United States (Doe 1l),
487 U.S. 201, 219 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 79. Emphasizing that the
comparison is meant to distinguish testimonial communications from non-testimonial
communications, the Boucher court states: "The combination conveys the contents of one's mind;
the key does not and is therefore not testimonial." In re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *4. The
"key" in this context may refer to a password that the creator has recorded, rather than solely
committed to memory. The password itself would not be incriminating unless it was "I, Boucher,
am guilty of possessing child pornography." If recorded voluntarily, the written password could be
compelled without violating the Fifth Amendment, similar to the compelled production of a
document. See Reitinger, supra note 94, at 197, 204. Yet, although production may be compelled,
the act of producing the recorded password or "key" may still be protected by the Fifth Amendment.
The court in Boucher recognized that if the Government was unaware of whether the accused
possessed the "key," then forcing the accused to surrender the key may implicitly communicate
existence, possession, and authentication. In re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *4 n. . See also
Sherry F. Colb, Does the Fifth Amendment Protect the Refusal to Reveal Computer Passwords? In a
Dubious Ruling, a Vermont Magistrate Judge Says Yes, FindLaw, (Feb. 4, 2008),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20080204.html ("[P]roducing either a key or a combination could
be testimonial if the government were essentially asking a suspect, 'Do you have control over this
locked (and criminally-suspicious) item?[']") (emphasis added). Yet, some argue that the Supreme
Court's failure in Doe H to afford Fifth Amendment protection to the defendant, when he was
compelled to provide his signature, demonstrates that providing a "key" is an entirely physical act
that lacks the testimonial aspects protected by the Fifth Amendment. See Brenner, supra note 144,
at 188. However, the Doe II Court's reasoning for not characterizing the defendant's act of
producing his signature or "key" as testimonial was that the consent form's hypothetical language
did not implicitly or explicitly convey existence, possession, or authenticity. See supra note 79
(further discussing the Doe II Court's holding). A password, on the other hand, presents a different
situation because the possessor of the password is most likely the one who created it as a means to
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that the production of both the drive Z files and the password were foregone
conclusions.147 The court reasoned that the Government had only viewed
some of Boucher's files and therefore lacked knowledge as to if and how
much other incriminating information existed on his laptop.148 With respect

privatize his documents. Thus, the act of producing the password could convey information more
testimonial and worthy of Fifth Amendment protection than was the case in Doe II.
147. In re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *6.
148. Id. FindLaw columnist Sherry Colb disagrees with the Boucher holding, arguing that
Boucher's knowledge of the password was a foregone conclusion and should not have been
protected under the Fifth Amendment. Colb, supra note 146. She argues that the Government
already knew that Boucher possessed the files and that Boucher knew the password. Id. The
purpose of requiring Boucher to provide the password was not meant to link Boucher with the
incriminating files or provide the Government with newly-discovered evidence, but rather to simply
provide the Government with "newly-accessible" files. Id. Therefore, because the Government can
already prove existence, possession, and authenticity based on the events during the border search,
the Government has overcome the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. Two U.S. Supreme Court cases
that have referenced the foregone conclusion doctrine are Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976) (foregone conclusion established) and UnitedStates v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000) (foregone
conclusion not proven). See Fisher discussion, supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text and
Hubbell discussion, supra note 94. In re Boucher differs from Fisher because in Fisher, the
accountant, not the defendant, was the creator and custodian of the documents, allowing the
Government to establish existence, possession, and authenticity through the accountant's testimony
rather than the defendant's actions. Hubbell may appear to more closely resemble Boucher's
situation because the Hubbell defendant was the custodian of the compelled documents and there
was no third party, like the accountant in Fisher, who provided the Government with independent
knowledge of existence, possession, and authenticity. However, with respect to the application of
the foregone conclusion doctrine, Boucher's case is entirely distinguishable. In Hubbell, the
Government lacked any prior knowledge about the subpoenaed documents that were subsequently
used against the defendant in trial. This was particularly demonstrated by the Government's use of
the documents to bring completely new and unrelated charges against the defendant. Alternatively,
in Boucher, the Government knew the nature of the files protected by Boucher's password. Customs
agents had already observed Boucher access the Z drive, viewed some of the Z drive's files during
the border search, and heard Boucher admit the files were his own. Thus, the customs agents could
subsequently testify' as to what they saw and heard to establish the Government's independent
knowledge and prove that existence, possession, and authenticity was a foregone conclusion.
Accordingly, Colb's argument that Boucher's password should not have received Fifth Amendment
protection is very strong. It seems that any time an authorized search is conducted at a customs
checkpoint, the traveler's production of his belongings for the agents to search automatically
conveys existence, possession, and authenticity. Thus, the subsequent act of producing information
in court that has previously been searched and uncovered at the border should not receive Fifth
Amendment protection. See Reitinger, supra note 94, at 196, 201, 199 ("[T]he government
generally can establish the authenticity of the underlying document and possession of it by showing
how it obtained the document-through search and seizure, interception, and so on-so these also
may be foregone conclusions. . . . Moreover, the government can establish the existence, possession,
and authenticity of the [document] without the aid of the [password] by presenting testimony and
evidence resulting from the search. . . . If the government can prove that I have the [recorded
password] that unlocks a particular ... document, then, just like any other document, my act of
producing the [password] is not testimonial regarding possession, and the government can require
me to produce the [password] . . . ."). Commentator Aaron Clemens disagrees with Reitinger, taking
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to the password, the court held that the foregone conclusion doctrine did not
apply to non-physical evidence because such evidence is comprised of facts
existing solely in the accused's mind, incapable of being independently
known by the Government.149
B.

The Boucher Court Failedto Consider its Decision'sRamifications at
the Border

Even though In re Boucher involved a border search, the court's
analysis did not consider the government's "inherent sovereign authority to
protect its territorial integrity."'s While protection of a password may be
appropriate in some circumstances, it is not warranted in the border search
context. A significant consequence of the Boucher holding is the possible
prevention of customs officials from effectively monitoring the information
and items transported across the country's borders. Indeed, if a traveler
refuses to provide the password to his laptop files, customs agents may never
gain access to them, and password protection becomes an easy means to
override the government's ability to conduct a sanctioned search.' 5 '
Although the Fifth Amendment would not apply if the government
could prove independent knowledge of existence, possession, and
authenticity of the compelled documents, the nature of a border search may
severely limit the government's ability to do so.15 2 The ambiguous standard
of proof that the government must meet to successfully establish a foregone

the position that if a password gives the Government access to documents other than those the
Government was aware existed, producing the password is sufficiently testimonial:
A prosecutor's bare assertion that a document exists cannot establish a document's
existence as a matter of law....
. . . [Ulnless the government had the defendant under intrusive surveillance, it cannot
prove that it has seized every single document that can be decrypted with [the password].
... [Password] production would give the government access both to documents
whose existence were proven and provide access (while authenticating) documents the
government did not know about.
Clemens, supra note 144. Clemens's approach corresponds with the Boucher court's conclusion that
the Government could not prove a foregone conclusion because it had not seen the other files on
drive Z. This issue remains unsettled as the Supreme Court has not specified a standard of proof that
the Government must meet to overcome the Fifth Amendment privilege. See supra note 94
(discussing the minimal guidance as to how the Government may establish independent knowledge).
149. In re Boucher, 2007 WL 4246473, at *6.
150. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 473 (1979); see also supra notes 29-37 and
accompanying text (discussing the government's broad authority to search at the border).
151. Privacy and protection expert and former federal prosecutor Mark Rasch believes that the
Boucher ruling is "dangerous" for law enforcement: "If it stands, it means that if you encrypt your
documents, the government cannot force you to decrypt them .... So you're going to see drug
dealers and pedophiles encrypting their documents, secure in the knowledge that the police can't get
at them." Nakashima, supra note 137.
152. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing the foregone conclusion doctrine
and its application in both Fisherand Hubbell).
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conclusion makes it unclear if, as Boucher held, independent knowledge of
each file protected by the password would be necessary.s 3 If such
expansive knowledge is required, it is unlikely that the government could
overcome the Fifth Amendment privilege in most cases, particularly due to
the lack of evidence available in the initial stages of an investigation. 15 4 In a
suspicionless laptop search that reveals only a few questionable file names, a
prosecutor will have little or no evidence to establish independent
knowledge of existence, possession, and authenticity, and the password will
likely remain protected.
Restricting customs officials' authority in this manner does not seem
consistent with the government's goal to regulate people and property
crossing the border. Moreover, it does not conform with the general
sentiment of the American people who, since September 11, 2001, generally
support heightened security measures even if their right to privacy is
lessened.'55 The 9/11 Commission, created to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the 2001 terrorist attacks, recommended that the government
take a more active role in maintaining the security of the nation's borders.s 6
Such security measures must include the inspection of laptops because it has
been established that terrorists use wireless electronic devices for the
"planning of attacks, fund raising, communication, and the dissemination of
propaganda."' 57 In fact, when investigating the 1993 World Trade Center

153. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Boucher court's reasoning).
See also supra note 94 (discussing the differing outcomes of Fisher and Hubbell, and the
"reasonable particularity" standard) and note 148 (comparing Reitinger's argument that extensive
knowledge would not be required with Clemens's assertion that the existence of each document
would need to be independently established before existence, possession, and authenticity could be
deemed a foregone conclusion).
154. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 562 n.8 (1978) (discussing the risks of using a
subpoena in criminal investigations).
155. Robert M. Bloom, Border Searches in the Age of Terrorism, 78 Miss. L.J. 295, 295 (2008).
156. See Rishikof, supra note 1, at 416. Rishikof discusses various programs supported by the
Department of Homeland Security that were created as a result of the 9/11 Commission's
suggestions. Id. The 9/11 Report recommended among other options: "1) creating a strategy to
combine terrorist intelligence, operations, and law enforcement; 2) integrating the U.S. border
security system into a larger network of screening points; 3) implementing a biometric entry-exit
screening system; and 4) enhancing international cooperation, particularly with Canada and
Mexico." Id. After the 9/11 Report, the former Customs Service, Border Patrol, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service were consolidated into the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), one official government agency run by the Department
of Homeland Security. See Importing into the United States: A Guide for Commercial Importers,
CBP Publication No. 0000-0504, 1 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler
/cgov/newsroom/publications/trade/iius.cttliius.doc.
157. Gilmore, supra note 40, at 787.
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bombing, officials uncovered detailed plans on the bomber's laptop to
Accordingly, providing Fifth Amendment
destroy U.S. airplanes.' 58
"render[] the enforcement powers of CBP
would
the
border
protections at
meaningless[,] . . . prevent the effective policing of our borders[,] ... [and]

undermine the compelling reasons that lie at the heart of the border search
doctrine."l 59
VI.

THE SOLUTION: CREATE A BORDER EXCEPTION TO THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT

In order to rectify the potential conflict between the Fourth Amendment
border search exception and the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, it is necessary to limit Fifth Amendment protections at the
border. 160 Congress could enact a statute requiring travelers to disclose their
laptop passwords during a border search, but courts could subsequently
strike down the law as unconstitutional.16 ' Thus, in order for customs
officials to exercise their broad authority to search laptops, it is necessary
that courts recognize a Fifth Amendment border exception. Such an
exception is reasonable as it would only be implemented at the border,
where citizens historically have been afforded limited constitutional
protections, and would only be employed to facilitate a lawful search.162
158. Id. at 788. Additionally, in a 2004 Pakistan raid, officials uncovered substantial amounts of
information stored on laptop computers about al-Qaeda's determination to commit continued
terrorist acts on the United States. Id.
159. Id. at 786, 788.
160. A Fifth Amendment limitation at the border would only include restricting an individual's
right against self-incrimination.
161. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) ("It is clear, of course, that
no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution."); Brenner, supra note 144, at 189.
Brenner notes:
The password holder would be faced with the alternatives of giving up the password and
thereby providing incriminating testimony or refusing to give it up and being held
criminally liable for refusing.
... Enforcing the statute would, in other words, be unconstitutional (a) when the
password holder had memorized the password and (b) when the government previously
did not know that this specific person was actually the possessor of a password (in
whatever form).
Id.
162. The CBP has often assured U.S. citizens that it is not their aim to infringe on travelers'
rights: "It is not our intent to subject legitimate travelers to undue scrutiny, but to ensure the safety
of the American public. In conducting these searches, we are fully dedicated to protecting the civil
rights of all travelers." Ahern, CBP Laptop Searches, supra note 3. In its July 2008 publication, the
CBP dedicated a section specifically to the handling of private information, such as trade secrets or
attorney-client privileged documents. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, supra note
127, at 4-5. The CBP publication explained that customs officers shall "take all reasonable
measures" to avoid public disclosure of any particularly sensitive documents. Id. at 4; see also
Ahern, Laptop Inspections, supra note 4 (urging Americans to look at the CBP's track record of
handling confidential information):
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A.

Policy ConsiderationsFundamentalto the Fourth Amendment Border
Exception Justify a Similar Fifth Amendment Exception

The Fourth Amendment is a prime example of a constitutional
provision, established to protect significant individual privacy rights, yet
encompassing numerous exceptions that preserve the government's
interest.
The policy considerations fundamental to the Fourth
Amendment's border exception, specifically the government's inherent right
to secure the nation's borders and protect American lives, similarly justify
the creation of a border exception to the Fifth AmendmentIM Statutes and

Every day, thousands of commercial entry documents, shipping manifests, container
content lists, and detailed pieces of company information are transmitted to CBP so we
can effectively process entries and screen cargo shipments bound for the United States.
This information is closely guarded and governed by strict privacy procedures.
Information from passenger laptops or other electronic devices is treated no differently.
... [O]fficers are subject to numerous policy restrictions regarding the retention,
sharing, and scrutiny of travelers' documents and information.
Id.
163. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. In California v. Acevedo, Justice Scalia
commented that "the 'warrant requirement' [has] become so riddled with exceptions that it [is]
basically unrecognizable." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
164. United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976), provides a useful summary of the
many reasons why the Fourth Amendment's probable cause and warrant requirements have not been
extended to border searches:
The purpose behind border searches has been variously phrased as the need to stem the
"flow of illegal aliens" into the United States; to "prevent importation of contraband or of
undeclared ... merchandise[]"; and to "search ... newly arrived vessels to determine
whether goods requiring entry are aboard." Other justifications include "the universal
understanding that persons, parcels and vehicles crossing the border may be searched,"
and the "recognition of the difficulty involved in effectively policing our national
boundaries."
The Fourth Amendment was designed to balance the government's interests in
enforcing its laws against the individual's interests in his dignity and privacy.... On
crossing a border, [a person entering or leaving the country] is on notice that a search
may be made, and his privacy is arguably less invaded by such search.
Thus both incoming and outgoing border-crossing searches have several features in
common: (1) the government is interested in protecting some interest of United States
citizens, such as restriction of illicit international drug trade, (2) there is a likelihood of
smuggling attempts at the border, (3) there is difficulty in detecting drug smuggling, (4)
the individual is on notice that his privacy may be invaded when he crosses the border,
and (5) he will be searched only because of his membership in a morally neutral class.
Id at 666-67 (citations omitted). Multiple circuit courts have applied similar reasoning to their
analysis of Fifth Amendment implications during border searches. See, e.g., United States v. Kiam,
432 F.3d 524, 529 (3d Cir. 2006) ("'A person seeking entry into the United States does not have a
right to remain silent.' An alien at the border of our country . .. must convince a border inspector of
his or her admissibility to the country by affirmative evidence.") (citation omitted); United States v.
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case law consistently emphasize that, at the border, the government's
interests are of greater weight than individual privacy interests.' 6 ' The
Supreme Court has stated that customs officials may search a traveler's
luggage "no matter how great the traveler's desire to conceal the contents
may be." 66 Although the Fifth Amendment does not specifically mention
searches, its protections can seriously impede a laptop border search by
denying the government access to the laptop's content.167 Customs agents
would not decline to search a locked briefcase merely because a traveler
wished to conceal its files; the result should not differ simply because the
"lock" is in electronic form.16 8
The need to maintain an appropriate balance of interests at the border
has resulted in the unwillingness of courts to limit the border search
exception, even when additional constitutional rights have been
implicated. 169 Defendants have argued First Amendment violations when
customs officials search "expressive material," such as laptop computers.o70

Fernandez-Ventura, 132 F.3d 844, 846-47 (1st Cir. 1998) ("In the context of Customs inspections,
our assessment of whether an interrogation is custodial must take into account the strong
governmental interest in controlling our borders. ... '[E]vents which might be enough to signal
custody away from the border will not be enough to establish custody in the context of entry into the
country."') (citations omitted); United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119-20 (lth Cir. 1996)
("Because of the overriding power and responsibility of the sovereign to police national borders, the
[F]ifth [A]mendment guarantee against self-incrimination is not offended by routine questioning of
those seeking entry to the United States. Thus, because of the sovereign's responsibility, some
degree of questioning and of delay is necessary and is to be expected at entry points into the United
States.") (citations omitted).
165. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing the balance of government and
individual interests at the border).
166. U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982).
167. The language of the Fifth Amendment is as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
168. See United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678 (W.D. Tex. 2008) ("A password on
a computer does not automatically convert a routine search into a non-routine search. A password is
simply a digital lock. Locks are usually present on luggage and briefcases, yet those items are
subject to 'routine' searches at ports of entry all the time."). At an airport, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has the right to cut off a non-TSA approved luggage lock in order to
further screen the contents of the bag. See Transportation Security Administration, Damaged Locks
Alert, http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/customer/claims/damagedlocks.shtm (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
169. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text (discussing the additional constitutional
claims made in Ickes and Arnold 11).
170. See United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) (defendant urged the court to
make an exception for First Amendment "expressive material"); see also supra note 105 and
accompanying text (discussing the defendant's argument in Ickes); People v. Endacott, 79 Cal. Rptr.

140

[Vol. 37: 105, 2009]

InternationalTravel with a "DigitalBriefcase"
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Yet, courts have found these claims unpersuasive because exempting
"expressive material" could essentially protect terrorist communications."'
Moreover, customs officials would face great difficulty trying to determine
the scope of First Amendment protection during each individual search.172
Courts should similarly refrain from limiting the border search
exception in response to Fifth Amendment infringement claims, and
accordingly, establish a Fifth Amendment border exception. Terrorist
information stored on laptops would likewise be protected if a password
rendered them inaccessible to customs officials.' 73 Customs officials would
also face the similar task of determining whether Fifth Amendment
protection was available during each particular search. For instance, a
traveler refusing to divulge his password might have a valid Fifth
Amendment privilege so long as his laptop contained criminally
incriminating content. 7 4 Yet, if a password prompt appeared immediately

3d. 907 (Ct. App. 2008); supra note 130.
171. See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506. Judge Wilkinson explains:
[T]he ramifications of accepting Ickes's First Amendment argument would be quite
staggering.... The border search doctrine is justified by the "longstanding right of the
sovereign to protect itself." Particularly in today's world, national security interests may
require uncovering terrorist communications, which are inherently "expressive."
Following Ickes's logic would create a sanctuary at the border for all expressive
material-even for terrorist plans[,] ... . [thus] undermin[ing] the compelling reasons
that lie at the very heart of the border search doctrine.
Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Arnold (Arnold 11), 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir.
2008), denying reh'g523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'g 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009); Endacott, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 909 (accepting the Ickes Court's
analysis regarding First Amendment implications of "expressive material").
172. Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506. Judge Wilkinson continues:
[R]ecognizing a First Amendment exception to the border search doctrine would ensure
significant headaches for those forced to determine its scope. Disputes about whether
material is obscene, for example, are not always easily resolved. Were we to carve out
this First Amendment exception, government agents at the border (and subsequently
courts) would be faced with ... .hav[ing] to decide-on their feet-which expressive
material is covered by the First Amendment. And then in cases where they conclude that
the exception applies, they would still have to determine if probable cause existed. These
sorts of legal wrangles at the border are exactly what the Supreme Court wished to avoid
by sanctioning expansive border searches. We refuse to put these issues into play and
thereby divert customs officials from their charge of policing our borders and protecting
our country.
Id (citations omitted).
173. This is exactly what Ickes and Arnold II hoped to prevent. See supra notes 170-71 and
accompanying text.
174. An individual can only assert his right against self-incrimination if he has a reasonable basis
for fearing criminal prosecution. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. For example,
assume a married couple travels together and customs officials request the password to the
husband's computer so they can search it. However, stored on the laptop are the husband's personal
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after powering on the traveler's laptop, customs agents would be unable to
view any of the laptop's files and, accordingly, would be prevented from
determining whether its content was sufficiently incriminating for Fifth
Amendment protection."' Courts would have to intervene each time such
password protection was utilized, making a customs officer's duty to screen
items extremely difficult.17 6 Thus, establishing a Fifth Amendment border
exception would accomplish the same goal as the current Fourth
Amendment exception by maintaining the traditional balance of government
and individual interests at the U.S. border.
B.

A Fifth Amendment BorderException is Appropriate, as the Right
Against Self-Incrimination has been Limited in Similar Regulatory
Search Contexts

Aside from border searches, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld
searches conducted without a warrant or particularized suspicion for such
purposes as public safety and administrative efficiency. '7 Similar to its

letters from a woman with whom he is having an affair. He may desperately want to prevent the
customs officials from searching through his files in case his wife should see the letters. Yet,
although discovery of this information could be devastating to the husband's marriage, it is not the
type of incriminating material constitutionally protected under the Fifth Amendment.
175. Laptop users can set their computers to display a password prompt after the computer boots
up, preventing access to any of the computer's data unless the correct password is entered. Suppose
a customs agent detains a traveler solely based on an anonymous tip that a terrorist will be entering
the country. The agent might assume that the traveler's laptop contains incriminating information,
but he cannot be certain. The ambiguity present with respect to Fifth Amendment protection in this
scenario would cause customs agents great difficulty in carrying out the search.
176. A judge, responsible for resolving whether testimony would be self-incriminating, would
also likely face difficulty in making this determination. See supra note 69 and accompanying text
(discussing the judge's role in deciding whether a witness has reasonable grounds to assert his right
against self-incrimination). It is also unclear whether a grand jury would even issue a subpoena to
compel a traveler to divulge the password that blocked the customs agent's access to the entire
laptop. It is true that the grand jury has extensive investigatory powers. See supra note 60; see also
United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) ("Unlike [the Supreme] Court, whose
jurisdiction is predicated on a specific case or controversy, the grand jury 'can investigate merely on
suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.' The
function of the grand jury is to inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its
investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred." (citing
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950))). However, if suspicion was not
present prior to attempting the search, the government may be overstepping its authority at the
border if it could validly infer possible illegal activity simply because an individual implemented
security, measures that prevented public access to his laptop. Alternatively, if the search was
predicated on an anonymous tip, a grand jury would probably be more likely to issue a subpoena,
legally compelling the traveler to provide his password. Nevertheless, it would still be unclear
whether the information was sufficiently self-incriminating to warrant Fifth Amendment protection.
177. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (upholding
suspicionless alcohol and drug testing of railroad employees involved in train accidents) ("The
Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety, like its
supervision of probationers or regulated industries, or its operation of a government office, school,
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justification for border searches, the Court has reasoned that searches
conducted in response to a special need and not predominately to enforce
criminal laws should not be subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement, but rather a reasonableness analysis that balances government
versus individual privacy interests.17 1 When government interests outweigh
individual privacy interests, as is usually the case during a border search,
limitations on traditional Fourth Amendment constraints are justified. "9
Included in this category of exceptional searches is the administrative or
regulatory search, an inspection authorized by Congress to enforce
regulatory laws affecting such areas as the health and safety of citizens and
interstate commerce. 80
Administrative searches must promote the

or prison, 'likewise presents special needs beyond normal law enforcement that may justify
departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements."') (citation omitted); Donovan
v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981) ("[A] warrant may not be constitutionally required when
Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory
scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner
of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic
inspections undertaken for specific purposes."); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
(holding that a warrant is not necessary to inspect the premises of registered gun dealers); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (rejecting a warrant requirement to inspect
the premises of liquor dealers because of the industry's long history of "close supervision and
inspection"). The Biswell Court explained: "When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively
regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business
records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection." Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
178. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., the Court faced the question of
whether traditional Fourth Amendment requirements applied to the search of a student's belongings,
conducted by a school official. In examining the search's reasonableness, the Court balanced the
student's legitimate expectation of privacy with the school's need to maintain a safe learning
environment for its students, ultimately concluding that the school's special safety needs
necessitated a limited application of the Fourth Amendment:
The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a
teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school
rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift
and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. Just as we have in other
cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when "the burden of obtaining a warrant is
likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search," we hold today that school
officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their
authority.
Id. at 340 (citation omitted).
179. See TL.O. discussion,supra note 178; see also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
180. See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 599 ("Congress has broad authority to regulate commercial
enterprises engaged in or affecting interstate commerce, and an inspection program may in some
cases be a necessary component of federal regulation."). Examples of administrative searches
involving a substantial government interest include "improving the health and safety conditions in
the Nation's underground and surface mines[,] ... [the] regulation of firearms ... to prevent violent
crime and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traffic within their borders[,] ... [and]
protecting the revenue against various types of fraud." New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702
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satisfaction of civil liberties, "directed at the public at large," and not solely
monitor a "selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities."'18 In
upholding the reasonableness of administrative searches, the Court has
focused on the search's "long history of judicial and public acceptance," the
"public interest . . . that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated,"

and on the fact that "the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed
at the discovery of evidence of crime, [and thus] involve a relatively limited
invasion of. . . privacy.",82 Even an administrative search that produces
criminal evidence or shares the same ultimate goals as penal laws will not
automatically be invalid if the search was conducted for a civil, regulatory
purpose.' 83 For instance, the Court has upheld the warrantless administrative
search of an automobile junkyard, even though the search revealed the
owner's possession of stolen vehicles and the regulation authorizing the
search was established to combat automobile theft.184

(1987) (citations omitted).
181. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 47 (1968) (requirement that the defendant
produce records to prove compliance with a federal wagering tax violated the Fifth Amendment
because regulation was directed at those involved in the illegal gambling business, a group
"inherently suspect of criminal activities"); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S.
70, 79 (1965) (statute requiring members of the Communist Party to register their membership status
with the Attorney General violated the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because
registration involved "an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form's
questions in context might involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of a crime").
182. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967); see also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) ("Certain industries have such a history of government oversight that no
reasonable expectation of privacy could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise.")
(citation omitted).
183. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (upholding a California statute requiring
all drivers to report their involvement in car accidents) ("Although the California Vehicle Code
defines some criminal offenses, the statute is essentially regulatory, not criminal. The California
Supreme Court noted that § 20002(a)(1) was not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to
promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents."); Burger, 482 U.S. at
713 ("[An administrative scheme may have the same ultimate purpose as penal laws, even if its
regulatory goals are narrower."). The BurgerCourt explained:
In United States v. Biswell, we recognized this fact that both administrative and penal
schemes can serve the same purposes by observing that the ultimate purposes of the Gun
Control Act were "to prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the
firearms traffic within their borders." It is beyond dispute that certain state penal laws
had these same purposes. Yet the regulatory goals of the Gun Control Act were
narrower: the Act ensured that "weapons [were] distributed through regular channels and
in a traceable manner and [made] possible the prevention of sales to undesirable
customers and the detection of the origin of particular firearms." The provisions of the
Act, including those authorizing the warrantless inspections, served these immediate
goals and also contributed to achieving the same ultimate purposes that the penal laws
were intended to achieve.
Id. (citations omitted).
184. Id. at 713-16. The Court also explained:
[T]he State has a substantial interest in regulating the vehicle-dismantling and
automobile-junkyard industry because motor vehicle theft has increased in the State and
because the problem of theft is associated with this industry. In this day, automobile theft
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Administrative inspections constitute a type of search whereby the Court
has not only limited Fourth Amendment requirements, but also has narrowed
the availability of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 85
For example, the Court has disallowed defendants to assert their Fifth
Amendment rights when compelled to produce tax returns, report an
accident, or even present one's child in court if compliance was required as
part of a regulatory scheme.186
Although such requirements might

has become a significant social problem, placing enormous economic and personal
burdens upon the citizens of different States.
Id at 708.
185. See Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990) ("The Court
has on several occasions recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist
compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State's public purposes unrelated to
the enforcement of its criminal laws.").
186. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000) ("[The fact that incriminating evidence
may be the byproduct of obedience to a regulatory requirement, such as filing an income tax return
[(United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927))], maintaining required records [(Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948))], or reporting an accident [(Californiav. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971))],
does not clothe such required conduct with the testimonial privilege."). In Shapiro, the Supreme
Court held that the defendant could not invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
to avoid the production of documents that the defendant was required to maintain as part of an
administrative scheme under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 17-18.
The Court explained that the required sales records, which revealed information about the
defendant's buying and selling transactions, were maintained "not for [the defendant's] private uses,
but for the benefit of the public, and for public inspection." Id Similarly, in Byers, the Court upheld
a "hit and run" statute requiring all drivers in a car accident to provide their names and addresses,
even though the disclosure requirements could reveal criminally incriminating information. Byers,
402 U.S. at 425. Concurring with the majority, Justice Harlan explained:
Considering the noncriminal governmental purpose in securing the information, the
necessity for self-reporting as a means of securing the information, and the nature of the
disclosures involved, I cannot say that the purposes of the Fifth Amendment warrant
imposition of a use restriction as a condition on the enforcement of this statute. To hold
otherwise would, it seems to me, embark us on uncharted and treacherous seas.
Id. at 458 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 557 (production of the
defendant's child in court not protected by the Fifth Amendment act of production privilege because
production was required under the state's regulatory scheme). In Bouknight, State Social Services
believed that the defendant's child was being abused. Id. at 552. The child was placed in foster care
and subsequently returned to the defendant, pursuant to several conditions. Id When the defendant
violated these conditions, the State ordered the defendant to produce her child in court so that Social
Services could take over custody. Id. The defendant again failed to comply, asserting that her Fifth
Amendment right precluded her from doing so. Id. at 553. The defendant argued that the act of
producing her child would be equivalent to her testimony that the child was in her possession and
control at the moment of production, and thus would assist the State in bringing charges against her.
Id. The Court rejected the defendant's argument, holding that compliance with the court order was
part of the defendant's duty under the State's regulatory scheme. Id. at 561. The Court explained
that once it was determined that the child was in need of the State's assistance, the State became
responsible for the child's safety, as the child was now a "particular object of the State's regulatory
interests." Id. at 559. When the State returned the child to the defendant, they entrusted her as the
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effectively compel incriminating testimony, the Court has restricted Fifth
Amendment protection in this context because of the privilege's ability to
prevent the government from carrying out its regulatory laws.187
It is reasonable, therefore, that the Court adopt a similar Fifth
Amendment limitation in the border search context, particularly due to the
broad regulatory goals shared by both administrative and border searches. 88
Like administrative searches, customs inspections at the border were
specifically established for a civil rather than a predominantly criminal
purpose, particularly to collect duties and prevent the introduction of
contraband into the United States.' 89 The Court has declared: "At the
border, customs officials have more than merely an investigative law
enforcement role. They are also charged, along with immigration officials,
with protecting this Nation from entrants who may bring anything harmful
into this country, whether that be communicable diseases, narcotics, or
explosives." 90 Thus, although border searches may and often do reveal
criminal evidence, the criminal aspect of the search is just one component of
an extensive, highly-regulated inspection aimed at monitoring all persons
and items moving in and out of the country.' 9'
child's "custodian," subject to routine inspection by the State. Id. The multiple orders to produce
the child in court were "part of a broadly directed, noncriminal regulatory regime governing children
cared for pursuant to custodial orders." Id. Accordingly, in such a situation, Fifth Amendment
protections were not available. Id. at 561. Cf Marchetti, 390 U.S. 39 (upholding Fifth Amendment
protection to preclude the production of records even though production was required as part of a
state regulation). In Marchetti, the defendant refused to produce records regarding his compliance
with a federal wagering tax imposed on those involved in the illegal gambling business. Id. at 60.
The Court allowed the defendant to assert his Fifth Amendment right, however, because the
regulatory scheme involved monitored wagering, which the Court explained, "is 'an area permeated
with criminal statutes,' and those engaged in wagering are a group 'inherently suspect of criminal
activities."' Id. at 47.
187. See Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 557. "[T]he ability to invoke the [Fifth Amendment] privilege
may be greatly diminished when invocation would interfere with the effective operation of a
generally applicable, civil regulatory requirement. .. . [It can also be diminished when] a person
assumes control over items that are the legitimate object of the government's noncriminal regulatory
powers. . . ." Id. at 557-58.
188. Bloom, supra note 155, at 303 ("As time has passed, border searches have merged into the
evolving administrative or regulatory search doctrine. These searches have one common element:
they are not being done for the normal law enforcement goal of finding criminals but for goals
unrelated to criminal investigation.").
189. See supranotes 29-30 and accompanying text and see infra text accompanying note 190.
190. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985).
191. Today, violations of current customs laws can carry both civil and criminal penalties. See
Importing into the United States, supra note 156, at 150. For instance, 19 U.S.C. § 1592 is a civil
fraud statute whereby violators are subject to monetary fines if "by fraud, gross negligence, or
negligence" they "enter, introduce, or attempt to enter or introduce any merchandise into the
commerce of the United States .... " 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a)(1)(A) (2006). Criminal penalties may
also exist for an individual who "enters or introduces, or attempts to enter or introduce, into the
commerce of the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false
invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement. . . or by means of
any false or fraudulent practice. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 542 (2006). Such penalties may include a fine, up
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The special regulatory needs satisfied by both border and administrative
searches justify current Fourth Amendment limitations. However, the Fifth
Amendment can still potentially interfere with the government's broad
regulation at the border, including the screening of travelers, the collection
of revenue, and the detection of contraband. The Court has already
expressed its concern regarding the Fifth Amendment's ability to impede
government regulation in the administrative search context, choosing to
restrict application of the privilege.192 The Court should thus implement an
analogous Fifth Amendment limitation with respect to border searches, as it
would be consistent with the Court's treatment of administrative searches
and is crucial for the continued security of our nation. 93

to two years imprisonment, or both. See § 542. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 includes civil and criminal
penalties for money laundering that takes place across U.S. borders. Civil penalties consist of the
value of the property or up to a $10,000 fine, and criminal penalties may include up to a $500,000
fine or twice the value of the funds involved in the transfer, up to twenty years imprisonment, or
both. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2), (b) (2006).
192. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
193. Even if a border exception to the Fifth Amendment is recognized, however, travelers could
effectively comply with the requirement to provide their password, but still prevent customs officials
from accessing all of their laptop's content. See What Can Customs Agents Do With Your Laptop?
Almost Anything They Want To, http://ridethelightning.senseient.com/2008/08/index.html (Aug. 21,
2008, 7:21 EST). DriveCrypt is a data encryption (password protection) program that not only
makes it very difficult for computer experts to access another person's computer files, but also
includes a feature allowing an individual to enter a secondary password to display false data. See
SecurStar, Encryption Software Solutions, http://www.securstar.com/productsdrivecrypt.php (last
visited Oct. 15, 2009). DriveCrypt allows users to create two passwords for the same password
prompt, one that protects personal, confidential information, and another that secures less delicate
information that the user would not mind another person viewing. Id When the password prompt
appears, the user can enter the secondary password to display the less sensitive information and
continue to hide the secured, highly confidential files. Id. No evidence will indicate that other data
is still securely stored on the computer. Id. At the border, a traveler whose laptop is equipped with
this program can enter his secondary password to reveal certain pre-determined files, but continue to
secure other information that customs officials will be unaware even exists. DriveCrypt also allows
users to conceal confidential information in music files, which customs officials will likely bypass
during a laptop search. Id. Because people could continue to create clever mechanisms that
circumvent the purpose of a password disclosure requirement, prohibiting the use of passwords
altogether may be the best option at the border. If Congress enacted legislation that prevented
people from traveling with a password-protected laptop, there would be no Fifth Amendment issue,
no need to guess whether the laptop's content included incriminating information, and the search
could be conducted much more efficiently. Moreover, the CBP already employs dozens of
restrictions as to what travelers may bring into the country, so a password-protected laptop would
merely be another prohibited item. The CBP has explained that "[t]he importation of certain classes
of merchandise may be prohibited or restricted to protect the economy and security of the United
States, to safeguard consumer health and well-being, and to preserve domestic plant and animal
life." Importing into the United States, supranote 156, at 106. A laptop password restriction would
similarly further the CBP's goal.
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VII. CONCLUSION
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals instructs in Arnold II, customs
officials have the authority to conduct suspicionless border searches of
laptops.194 Alternatively, In re Boucher offers the proposition that a
password is protected under the Fifth Amendment, allowing an individual to
withhold production of it when compelled to do so by the Government.19 5
The implications of these two cases at the border are tremendous, as an
individual can essentially password protect the files on his laptop and
impede the government's ability to search. The longstanding recognition of
the principles underlying the border search exception suggests that the
government would not be willing to allow such a scenario to take place.' 96
Accordingly, a Fifth Amendment exception should be implemented to limit
an individual's assertion of the right against self-incrimination.' 9 7 Such an
exception would only infringe the rights of travelers in a very narrow
context, while assuring the safety of all citizens within the U.S. border.
VIII. POSTSCRIPT

98

On February 19, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Vermont reversed the magistrate judge's In re Boucher ruling.1 99 The
district court held that Boucher lacked a Fifth Amendment act of production
privilege, which would have allowed him to refuse compliance with the
subpoena. 200 The district court's decision was based upon consideration of
the Government's revised subpoena request, which no longer compelled
Boucher to produce his password, but rather to produce "an unencrypted

194. United States v. Arnold (Arnold fl), 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), denying reh'g 523 F.3d
941 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'g 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312
(2009).
195. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev'd, 2009 WL
424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
196. See supra Part II.B. Retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor expressed the
country's likely response after the September, 11, 2001 terrorist attacks:
The trauma that our nation suffered will [alter] and has already altered our way of
life,... and it will cause us to reexamine some of our laws pertaining to criminal
surveillance, wiretapping, immigration, and so on .... As a result, we are likely to
experience more restrictions on our personal freedom than has ever been the case in our
country.
Bloom, supranote 155, at 295.
197. See supra Part VI.
198. This article was written prior to the district court's reversal of In re Boucher,No. 2:06-mj-91,
2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev'd, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
199. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *4 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). For a
discussion of the magistrate judge's ruling see supra notes 134-49 and accompanying text.
200. In re Boucher, 2009 WL 424718, at *4.
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version of the Z drive." 201 Consequently, the district court's ruling did not
discuss the implications of providing one's password and instead,
concentrated on the inferences associated with the production of a nonpassword protected version of Boucher's Z drive.202
The opinion focused on whether the foregone conclusion doctrine
applied to prevent Boucher from asserting his Fifth Amendment right.203
Contrary to the magistrate judge's decision, the district court concluded that
the foregone conclusion doctrine did apply in this case.2 04 The court
explained that Second Circuit precedent does not require the Government to
have knowledge of the incriminating content of the files and therefore, prior
observation of all of Boucher's Z drive files was not needed.205 Rather, only
knowledge of the location and existence of the Z drive and its files was
necessary, which was established with reasonable particularity when
customs agents both witnessed Boucher access his Z drive and viewed the

201. Id at *2. The Government's former subpoena ordered Boucher to "provide all documents,
whether in electronic or paper form, reflecting any passwords used or associated with the Alienware
Notebook Computer, Model D9T, Serial No. NKD900TA5LOO859, seized from Sebastien Boucher
at the Port of Entry at Derby Line, Vermont on December 17, 2006." Id.
202. Although the district court did not examine the password issue, one commentator notes that
even if Boucher is required to produce the Z drive, as opposed to the password, production of an
unencrypted version of the drive admits both that the Z drive exists and that Boucher has the
password to access it. North Carolina Criminal Law blog, Encrypted Computer Files and the Fifth
Amendment, http://sogweb.sog.unc.edu/blogs/ncclaw/?p=147 (Mar. 19, 2009, 11:13 EST). Yet, if a
reviewing court determined that because Boucher accessed the Z drive during the border search,
existence, possession, and authenticity of his password was a foregone conclusion, then Boucher's
act of producing the unencrypted drive would not implicitly communicate incriminating testimony.
Id. However, in an alternative fact pattern that differs from Boucher's case, a limitation to the
foregone conclusion doctrine may be necessary:
Imagine that officers determine that a computer located in a college dorm room is sharing
child pornography over the internet. They search the room when no one is present, and
seize the computer, which is on and which contains child pornography. Just as in
Boucher, the officers shut the computer down, and later find that its hard drive is
encrypted. They issue a grand jury subpoena to roommate A, asking him to produce an
unencrypted copy of the drive. Arguably, the foregone conclusion doctrine still applies:
the officers know of the existence and location of the drive. But if roommate A produces
an unencrypted copy of the drive, he's implicitly admitting that he has the password,
which shows that he, rather than (or in addition to) roommate B, controlled the computer.
That's information that the prosecution didn't already have, and a different result seems
appropriate in that case.
Id
203. In re Boucher, 2009 WL 424718, at *3-4.
204. Id at *3. See supra note 148 and accompanying text discussing the magistrate judge's
determination that the foregone conclusion doctrine did not apply because the Government failed to
view all the drive Z files.
205. In reBoucher,2009 WL 424718, at *3.
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illegal content of some of the drive's files. 206 Thus, the court explained,
Boucher's production of the unencrypted Z drive would not provide the
Government with additional information as to the existence and location of
the files.207 Moreover, although the act of producing the Z drive would
essentially authenticate it as the one subpoenaed, the court noted the
Government's claim that it could connect Boucher with the Z drive files
without using Boucher's act of production.208 So long as Boucher's act of
production was not used for authentication purposes, the court held Boucher
was required to produce the unencrypted Z drive.209
The district court's reversal highlights a split in interpretation regarding
the degree of knowledge the Government must possess in order to establish
a foregone conclusion. Does knowledge of existence and location refer to
knowledge of each individual document, necessitating the Government's
awareness of the specific incriminatory content contained in each file? Or is
the burden less stringent, requiring that the Government possess knowledge
of the existence and location only of the document's source, such as the hard
drive or computer? The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed that the act of
production is not privileged when the information would "add[] little or

206. Id. at *3. In support of its conclusion, the court cited the Second Circuit opinion of In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992 (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), I F.3d 87
(2d. Cir. 1993), in which the Government successfully established that the existence and location of
a subpoenaed calendar was a foregone conclusion. In In re GrandJury Subpoena, the Government,
suspicious of the authenticity of the defendant's photocopied calendar, sought production of the
defendant's original calendar to verify whether certain entries had been "whited-out" before it was
copied. Id. at 89. The defendant asserted his Fifth Amendment right, arguing that the calendar was
protected as his "intimate personal document." Id. at 90. The court concluded that a Fifth
Amendment act of production privilege was unavailable because the defendant's prior production of
the copied calendar and his testimony about his prior use of it established that the calendar's
existence and location was a foregone conclusion. Id. at 93.
207. Interestingly, the magistrate judge also relied upon In re Grand Jury Subpoena to
alternatively conclude that viewing each individual file would be necessary to assert the foregone
conclusion doctrine. See In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473 at *5 (D. Vt. Nov. 29,
2007), rev'd, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). The magistrate judge distinguished In re
GrandJury Subpoena from the facts of Boucher by noting that the Government in the former case
had already possessed a copy of the defendant's calendar and thus obtaining the original would not
add to the sum total of information known by the Government. Id. Contrarily, in Boucher, because
the Government had not viewed all of Boucher's files, the Government did not know the extent of
their incriminating effect, and production of them would add to the Government's sum total of
information. Id. at *6. One could argue, however, that the Government in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena did not know the content of the potential "whited-out" entries, and therefore, if the
original calendar did contain entries not present on the copy, production of the original calendar
would add to the sum total of the Government's knowledge and thus resemble Boucher's situation.
Although the degree of knowledge that the Government must possess to prove a foregone conclusion
remains unclear, it seems overly burdensome to require such specific knowledge.
208. Id. at *4.
209. Id. The district court noted that it was making no determination on whether the Government
could in fact authenticate the drive Z or its files. Id. at *4 n.2. Such a ruling would be made when
Boucher finally produced the evidence in court.
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nothing to the sum total of the Government's information. ,210 Yet, a
determination of whether the production of evidence adds to the
Government's sum total of information is subject to varying interpretations
when it is unclear if knowledge refers solely to the existence and location of
documents or alternatively, to the content of each document. Because the
Supreme Court has not adopted a standard of knowledge necessary in the
foregone conclusion context, In re Boucher may likely reach the Court in the
future and redefine the scope of Fifth Amendment protection.
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